no choice but to yield.[189] When she was finally, on March 6, 1898, prevailed upon to sign the Agreement with Germany, the Government of the latter declined to publish anything but its first section containing the use and lease of Kiao-chau,[190] and the contents of its other two sections concerning the railway and mining privileges granted to Germany[191] in the Shan-tung Province, as well as a separate agreement concerning the direct reparation for the crime of Kü-ye, have not, so far as is known, been officially given to the world from Berlin.[192] The act of Germany was a _débâcle_, and in the concessions she wrested from China were involved questions of grave importance and far-reaching consequences. In the first place, was not the lease of a commanding port in reality an infringement of the territorial sovereignty of the Chinese Empire? In the second place, how could the preference given to Germany in the future railway and mining operations in one of the richest of the eighteen Provinces be reconciled with the principle of the equal opportunity for the economic enterprise of all nations in China? If the action of Germany could be, as it soon seemed to be, used by other Powers as a precedent, would not the consequences for the cause, to say the least, of the fair treatment and mutual harmony in China of the nations among themselves be disastrous? It is interesting to observe the attitude taken toward this incident by Great Britain, the Power which possessed the greatest interest in insisting upon, as well as strongest power to enforce, the two cardinal principles of the world’s diplomacy in China, namely, the territorial sovereignty of the Chinese Empire and the equality therein of economic opportunity for all nations. Official dispatches of the day clearly indicate that, on the one hand, Germany made efforts to allay the susceptibilities of Great Britain, and that, on the other, the British remonstrances were not only so mollified as to be ineffective, but were also turned in such a direction as only to add to the dangers of the situation. Let us observe how this was done. It was repeatedly declared, during the negotiations between Germany and China, by the German Representatives at Peking and London and by Herr von Bülow himself, that the northern port of Kiao-chau had been chosen for its remoteness, for one thing, from the regions in which England was directly interested; that nothing was being done during the negotiations with China which would be embarrassing to Great Britain; that Germany was raising no objections to the British terms of the Anglo-German loan to China now under consideration; that the management of the new colony would be found to be liberal, for the German Government was convinced that the British system of colonization was the right one; and that the Kaiser and his Government were strong partisans of a good understanding between Germany and England.[193] Beside these assurances from Germany, it is interesting