Yang-tsze valley, and England pledging similarly in regard to Russian concessions beyond the Great Wall. (See _China, No. 2 (1899)_, No. 138.) The Russian Government naturally considered the conclusion of this agreement as a diplomatic victory over the British, and seemed to have interpreted its terms as implying that all the territory beyond the Great Wall was the Russian sphere, not only of railway concessions, but also of general interests and influence. Already in May of the same year, M. Pavloff renewed his demand at Peking for the concession of a Russian railway to be built directly to the Chinese capital, thus even overreaching the limit set in the British agreement of less than a fortnight previous. See _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 112, 116, 120, 129, 132–133, 214–215. Footnote 228: _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 101, 105, 108, 110, 114, 120, 149. Footnote 229: _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 104. Footnote 230: _Ibid._, No. 114. Footnote 231: _Ibid._, No. 120. Footnote 232: _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 138. The Marquess did not refer to a matter of enormous importance, that the proposed railways would _connect_ the immense land and sea forces of Russia, which he emphasized. Footnote 233: _China, No. 1 (1900)_, Nos. 123 and 133. Footnote 234: “I cannot say that my efforts were successful.... I was unable to induce his Excellency to modify his views.”—_Ibid._, Nos. 125 and 132. Footnote 235: _Ibid._, No. 126. Footnote 236: _China, No. 1 (1900)_, No. 129. Footnote 237: _Ibid._, No. 138. Footnote 238: _Ibid._, Nos. 134, 136, and 137. Footnote 239: Cf. _ibid._, Nos. 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 149, and 151. Footnote 240: _Ibid._, No. 144. The agreement was signed at Peking on July 1. See _Treaty Series_, No. 14, 1898. Footnote 241: “Balance of power in Gulf of Pechili is materially altered by surrender of Port Arthur by the Yamên to Russia. It is therefore necessary to obtain,” etc.—Salisbury to MacDonald, March 25; _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 129. Cf. also _China, No. 1 (1899)_, No. 2. It should be said, in justice to Great Britain, that at first, when the Chinese Government intimated toward the end of February that they would lease Wei-hai-Wei to her if she would accept it, Lord Salisbury considered such an offer premature, for his Government “aimed at discouraging any alienation of Chinese territory.”—_Ibid._, Nos. 90 and 91. Footnote 242: