by Great Britain, by lease or otherwise, and all ‘spheres of interest’ now held, or that may hereafter be held in China.” Beside these assurances, the Russian assent was highly significant, which, with the reservation similar to that of the other Powers, stated: “As to the ports now opened, or hereafter to be opened, to foreign commerce _by the Chinese Government_,[259] and which lie _beyond_ the leased territory to Russia, the settlement of the question of customs duties belongs to China herself, and the Imperial Government [of Russia] has no intention whatever of claiming any privileges for its own subjects to the exclusion of foreigners.” But “in so far as the territory leased by China to Russia is concerned, the Imperial Government [of Russia] has already demonstrated its firm intention to follow the policy of the ‘open door’ by creating Dalny (Talien-wan) a free port; and _if at some future time that port, although remaining free itself, should be separated by a custom-limit from other portions of the territory in question_, the customs duties would be levied, in the zone subject to the tariff, upon all _foreign_ merchants without distinction as to nationality. With the conviction,” the Russian note concluded, “that this reply is such as to ratify the inquiry made in the aforementioned note [of the United States], the Imperial Government is happy to have complied with the wishes of the American Government, especially as it attaches the highest value to anything that may strengthen and consolidate the traditional relations of friendship existing between the two countries.”[260] On the strength of the various replies from the Powers, however, the United States Government considered that “the Declaration suggested by the United States on that subject [i. e., the proposals about the Chinese trade] had been accepted by those Powers,” and regarded the assent given by them “as final and definite.”[261] It is interesting to note that no Power made a formal declaration[262] suggested by Secretary Hay, who, however, seems to have deemed the replies with reservations as equivalent to such a declaration. It is problematical whether this exchange of notes did in the slightest degree have the effect of changing the actual situation, at least so far as Russia was concerned. ----- Footnote 257: _China, No. 2 (1900)_, No. 1. Footnote 258: _Ibid._, Nos. 2, 3, 4, and inclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, in No. 5. Footnote 259: The italics in the quotations are the author’s. Footnote 260: _China, No. 2 (1900)_, inclosure 6 in No. 5. Footnote 261: _Ibid._, No. 5, White to Salisbury, March 30, 1900. Footnote 262: Cf. _ibid._, No. 6. CHAPTER VI THE OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA