The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and IssuesAsakawa, Kan'ichi
History
The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues
Asakawa, Kan'ichi
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905; Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 -- Causes
increased.[285] It was on August 14, the day when the allied forces had
almost reached Peking, that General Groderkoff in command of the
northern army of the Manchurian invasion wrote to the Minister of War at
St. Petersburg: “Fifty years ago Nevelskoy raised the Russian flag at
the mouth of the Amur, on its right bank, and laid the foundation for
our possessions on that great river. Now, after hard fighting, we have
taken possession of the right bank, thus consolidating the great
enterprise of annexing the whole of the Amur to Russia’s dominions, and
making that river an internal waterway and not a frontier stream,
whereby free and unmolested navigation of that artery through one of the
vastest regions of the Empire has been secured.” Indeed, by the time
when the Peking Legations were relieved, the major part of Manchuria had
been reduced under a military occupation by Russia.[286] This may be
said to mark a new stage in the development of the Manchurian question,
for no longer was this vast territory a mere sphere of Russian
influence; it was a prize of conquest.[287] The problem for the
Government of the Czar henceforth seemed to the outside world to be not
so much how it might tighten its hold upon Manchuria, as how it might
convert the temporary occupation into a permanent possession.
[Illustration:
COUNT LAMSDORFF
_Russian Foreign Minister_
]
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Footnote 263:
It may reasonably be said that the meaning of the intervention of
Russia, France, and Germany, in 1895, in regard to Japan’s claim upon
the Liao-tung Peninsula may be gathered, in a retroactive way, from
Russia’s conduct in Manchuria since 1896. At any rate, M. Pavloff
declared, in October, 1897, that “the Russian Government intended that
the provinces of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come
under the influence of any nation except Russia.”—_China, No. 1
(1898)_, p. 6. This declaration throws light not only on the
trans-Manchurian railway concessions and the lease of ports, but also
on Russia’s action respecting the Northern Railway extension and the
consequent Anglo-Russian agreement of April, 1899. In May, 1898, there
were already 200 Russian soldiers in Kirin, and in December, 2000 in
Port Arthur and Talien-wan, while many Cossacks guarded railway
construction, and many barracks were being hurriedly built, so that
there were sufficient indications even before 1900 that Russia
regarded Manchuria as her sphere of influence.
Footnote 264:
May 29.—_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 5.
Footnote 265:
Cf. _China, No. 4 (1900)_, No. 1 (June 5).
Footnote 266:
_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 94; _No. 4 (1900)_, No. 1 (June 8).
Footnote 267:
_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 219 (June 16–26).
Footnote 268:
_Ibid._, No. 133; _No. 4 (1900)_, No. 2 (evening, June 13).
Footnote 269:
_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 122 (June 13).
Footnote 270:
_Ibid._, Nos. 132, 148, 157, and 186 (June 17).
Footnote 271:
_Ibid._, No. 157.
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