In the strict theory of the comitatus, the gesíð could possess no property of his own; all that he acquired was his lord’s, and even the liberalities of the lord himself were only _beneficia_ or loans, not absolute gifts[318]: he had the usufruct only during life, the _dominium utile_: the _dominium directum_> was in the lord, and at the death of the tenant it is obvious that the estate vested in the lord alone: the gesíð could have no _ius testamenti_, as indeed he had no family: the lord stood to him in place of father, brother and son. Hereditary succession, which must at first have been a very rare exception, could only have arisen at all either from the voluntary or the compelled grant of the lord: it could only become general when the old distinction between the free markman and the gesíð had become obliterated, and the system of the Comitatus had practically and politically swallowed up every other. Yet even under these circumstances it would appear that a perfectly defined result was not attained; and hence, although the document entituled “Rectitudines singularum personarum” numbers the _ius testamenti_ among the rights of the þegen[319], yet even to the close of the Anglosaxon monarchy, we find dukes, præfects, kings’ thanes, and other great nobles humbly demanding permission from the king to make wills, entreating him not to disturb their testamentary dispositions, and even bribing his acquiescence by including him among the legatees. In this as in all human affairs, a compromise was gradually found necessary between opposing powers, and the king as well as the comites, neither of whom could dispense with the assistance of the other, found it advisable to make mutual concessions. I doubt whether at even an earlier period than the eleventh century, the whole body of thanes would have permitted the king to disregard the testament of one of their body, unless upon definite legal grounds, as for example grave suspicion of treason: but still they might consent to the nominal application and sanction of the ancient principle, by allowing the insertion of a general petition, that the will might stand, in the body of the instrument[320]. ----- Footnote 318: