The right of private warfare, technically called fǽhðe or _feud_[495], was one which every Teutonic freeman considered inalienable; and which, coupled with the obligations of family, was directly derived from his original position as a freeman[496]: it was the privilege which he possessed before he consented to enter into any political bond, the common term upon which all freemen could meet in an equal form of polity. It was an immediate corollary from that primæval law of nature, that each man may provide for his own defence, and use his own energies to secure his own well-being, and the quiet possession of his life, his liberty and the fruits of his labour. History and tradition both assure us that it did exist among the tribes of the North: and it is reasonable to suppose that it must have done so, especially in any case where we can conceive separate families and households to have maintained at all an independent position toward one another. Where no _imperium_ yet exists, society itself possesses only a _ius belli_ against its own several members; and if neighbours will not be neighbourly, they must be coerced into peace (the great and first need of all society and the condition of its existence) by alliance of the many against the few, of the orderly and peaceful against the violent and lawless. This right of feud then lies at the root of all Teutonic legislation; and in the Anglosaxon law especially it continues to be recognized long after an imperial power has been constituted, and the general conservancy of the peace has been committed to a central authority. It admits as its most general term, that each freeman is at liberty to defend himself, his family and his friends; to avenge all wrongs done to them, as to himself shall seem good; to sink, burn, kill and destroy, as amply as a royal commission now authorizes the same in a professional class, the recognized executors of the national will in that behalf. Now it is obvious that such a power, exercised in its full extent, must render the formation of an orderly society difficult, if not impossible. The first problem then is to devise means by which private vengeance may be regulated, private wrong atoned, the necessity of each man’s doing himself right avoided, and the general state of peace and security provided for. For setting aside the loss to the whole community which may arise from private feud, the moral sense of men may be shocked by its results: an individual’s own estimate of the satisfaction necessary to atone for the injury done to him, may lead to the commission of a wrong on his part, greater than any he hath suffered; nor can the strict rule of “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,” be applied, where the exaction of the penalty depends upon the measure of force between appellant and defender. ----- Footnote 495: