I have remarked in an earlier chapter[878] upon the union of the sacerdotal with the judicial power: at a very early stage of human society, the functions of the priest and the judge seem in general to have been inseparable; nor were they separated in fact upon the introduction of Christianity. In the very commencement of our æra, when the church really did exist as a brotherhood under the guidance of the first disciples, it was most natural that all contentions between members of the body should be settled by the arbitration of the whole church, or such as represented it. Litigation before the ordinary tribunals of the state, even could such have been resorted to by Christians, was little consonant with the doctrine of charity which was to prevail among the members of one mystical body, founded on almighty Love. Accordingly St. Paul himself[879] expressly forbids the disciples to carry their contentions before the secular authorities, implying that it is their duty to bring them to the consideration of their fellow-believers, that they may be amicably settled, in the spirit of forbearance and Christian moderation. And as persecution gradually threatened the terrified community, this course became unavoidable: it was impossible for the Christian to submit to the pagan forms of the tribunals, yet to refuse these was to proclaim the adoption of a proscribed and illegal association. The establishment of a hierarchy among the Christians themselves supplied some remedy for this difficulty, and it was soon decided that the disputes of the brotherhood were to be brought before the presbyter or bishop as a judge,—a course which in itself was natural in countries where the Romans had permitted the existence of some authority in the national tribunals, and had not insisted upon dragging every cause before their own officers. The peculiar situation of the Christians themselves as citizens of a new state—viz. the religious state—tended to consolidate this system. Christianity took cognizance of motives, of acts entirely beyond the reach of mere human law, and the community claimed a right to judge of the internal as well as the external state of its members. Immorality, not cognizable by any positive law, was a proper subject for the animadversion of a body whose duty it was to exclude from communion all who pertinaciously refused to perform the duties of their profession. It was thus that a twofold jurisdiction became lodged in the church,—and in the bishop or presbyter, as its representative in each particular locality,—long before the reception of Christianity among the _religiones licitae_ transformed the customs of an obscure sect into recognised laws of the empire. But no sooner had the terms of the great alliance been arranged, than the state hastened to give the imperial sanction to what had hitherto been merely the bye-laws of a sodality: and the decisions of a council, if confirmed by the assent of the