For years William II has unceasingly laboured to persuade England that she has every interest to join the Triple Alliance. His perseverance in this direction is quite natural. But if Germany succeeded last year in concluding an agreement with England on a few special questions, the Hague Conference has proved that it does not involve an agreement in matters of general policy. Nevertheless, William II counted on this Congress to produce closer relations with Great Britain. He hoped that the Congress would result in sharp antagonism between England and Russia and he reckoned on this antagonism to help him to inflict a severe defeat on Russia, which in its turn would have enabled him to draw one or other of these two Powers into the orbit of his policy. Great then was the disappointment of the German Emperor _when, from the very outset of the Conference, England, performing a most unexpected volte-face, made proposals on the subject of arbitration, which went a great deal farther than the Russian proposals laid before, the Congress. This master-stroke of British diplomacy compelled Germany to come out into the open and to reveal herself in her true light: that is to say, as the only obstacle to the fulfilment of the Tzar's humanitarian designs_. The Stengels, Zorns and Schwartzkopfs completed the success of British diplomacy by the brutal violence of their opposition and the cynicism of their proposals. It was not only on the two committees that dealt with arbitration and disarmament that German opposition (always supported by Turkey alone) wrecked the magnanimous attempt of Nicholas II to minimise the horrors of war. The committee presided over by M. de Martens succeeded in effecting certain improvements in the terms of the Brussels Convention; if the labours of its President and members were not successful in doing more to lessen the evils of war upon land, the fact is again due to the opposition of the German representatives. Thus, for instance, the humane measures proposed in forbidding the bombardment of open towns and private dwellings unoccupied by troops, or the destruction of unfortified villages, were not adopted because the German delegate insisted on the impossibility of limiting the powers of a commander-in-chief, who must remain the sole judge of the utility of such destruction in the general interest of military operations. It was the same in the case of the article whereby it was proposed that provinces occupied by enemy forces should be guaranteed in the maintenance of their autonomous administration and in certain rights against the demands of invasions, Germany declared her unwillingness to fetter in any way the decision of her army commanders.