opposed to monarchy, and incited by the example of the French Revolution, had been established. Here, again, the Government had made a fatal mistake. Members of these societies had been convicted in numbers, and sent to sea as a punishment. These men almost naturally became ringleaders and partakers in the mutiny, which would, however, have occurred sooner or later, under any circumstances. In the case of the mutiny at Spithead, about to be recounted, the sailors exhibited an organisation and an amount of information which might have been expected from “sea-lawyers” rather than ordinary Jack Tars; while in the more serious rebellion of the Nore, the co-operation of other agents was established beyond doubt. The first step taken by the men was perfectly legitimate, and had it been met in a proper spirit by the authorities, this history need never have been penned. At the end of February, 1797, the crews of four line-of-battle ships at Spithead addressed separate petitions to Lord Howe, Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, asking his kind interposition with the Admiralty, to obtain from them a relief of their grievances, so that they might at length be put on a similar footing to the army and militia, in respect both of their pay and of the provision they might be enabled to make for their wives and families. Lord Howe, being then in bad health, communicated the subject of their petitions to Lord Bridport and Sir Peter Parker, the port admiral, who, with a want of foresight and disregard of their country’s interest which cannot be excused, returned answer that “the petitions were the work of some evil-disposed person or persons,” and took no trouble to investigate the allegations contained in them. Lord Howe, therefore, did nothing; and the seamen, finding their applications for redress not only disregarded, but treated with contempt, determined to compel the authorities to give them that relief which they had before submissively asked.