One would naturally think that a treaty which in its stipulations thus silently passed over the very questions in dispute, and for which so much valiant blood had been shed and such a loss of life and treasure endured, would have been met with open condemnation, or at least with sullen acquiescence. On the contrary, however, its ratification was signalized by public rejoicings, and the most extravagant manifestations of delight. The astonishing victory at New Orleans required us to be generous, and a nation which had thus vindicated its rights on sea and land, could afford to drop an unpleasant subject just where the discussion had begun. Such seemed to be the general feeling. At first sight, this settlement of the difficulties between the two countries appeared contemptible. Abstractly considered it was, and if we had been a weak nation, sinking into degeneracy, it would have proved so. But in judging of it we must remember that treaty stipulations in continental diplomacy, like flags of truce in Mexico, depend almost entirely on circumstances whether they are regarded or not, and hence the _circumstances_ are more important than written stipulation. European treaties, like European diplomacy, have in the past, served only to illustrate the duplicity and faithlessness of monarchs. The question is, how events in their progress have settled the difficulties, as _fate_ settles them, and not as commissioners. Now it was evident, both to the English and American commissioners, that articles on neutral rights and the impressment of seamen, were useless. Our navy and privateers had disposed of those questions, for ever. Our broadsides furnished better guaranties than strips of parchment, adorned with impressions of regal seals. It was the fact that those two great causes of hostility, violation of neutral rights and impressment of seamen, were practically and permanently disposed of, which reconciled the nation to their omission in the treaty. Our people pay no attention to forms, only so far as they sanction their just claims. In this view, the acquiescence in the treaty, instead of exhibiting humility and fear on our part, indicate quite the reverse. Nothing can be more erroneous than to suppose that because those rights, for the protection of which we had gone to war, were not mentioned in the treaty, we therefore had concluded to waive them. On the contrary, we consented to leave them unnoticed, _because_ we knew we had _obtained_ them forever. No one in England or the United States doubted that these were definitely settled, and those who sneeringly ask "what we gained by the war?" make the letter equivalent to the spirit, a form more important than a fact. The simple truth is, we got what we fought for, and it exhibits a narrow spirit to say, that because it was not engrossed on parchment it amounted virtually to nothing. CHAPTER XII.