Philosophy and religion -- Study and teaching (Secondary) -- United States
“It seems to me,” said Marian, who had been dreaming, “that there is no
absolute truth. When people claim that they have found the whole truth,
and try to explain it to me, I never feel convinced.”
“Does our idea strike you so, Marian?” I asked.
“Oh, no,” she said, “not at all. You never make positive statements.”
“No,” I answered, “I am willing to grant that what seems true to me now
may one day be included in a larger truth.”
We spoke a few words, here, of envy. They agreed at once that artistic
envy, the envying of capabilities and talents, was impossible to one who
felt that others were doing things for him, that what he lacked in
himself he would find in others, for his satisfaction.
“But,” said Florence, “there are so many other kinds of envy, where
other people having the thing does you no good.”
“That’s true,” I said; “a beggar, for instance, envying the rich people
in a restaurant for their food, will not lose his hunger through seeing
them eat.”
I told them of the danger and difficulty of our philosophy of right and
wrong, how I hesitated to tell it to them for fear they might misuse it,
and how much harder it was to guide one’s self by so big a standard than
by an unbeautiful, ready-made morality of little laws and precepts. He
must take the straight and narrow path, who cannot guide himself across
the prairies by the path of stars and planets.
Virginia insisted on my repeating some facts I had told her lately. A
young French girl of good education, made desperate by poverty and lack
of work, slashed a picture in the Louvre, in order to be arrested, get
shelter and food, and attract attention to the injustice of her lot. We
discussed such cases, and decided that where society did so great a
wrong, the lesser wrong might be part of the cure.
“I cannot judge people,” I said, “when circumstances drive them to do
wrong in self-defence.”
We came near forgiving every one, when I reminded them of the sternness
of our standard. It made us lenient with others, who did not—and
perhaps could not—know that they might master circumstance, and that
the whole world was their whole self. But with ourselves it made us
terribly exacting.
“Some people are like animals,” said Virginia. “I can’t understand them,
and cannot sympathize with them.”
“That,” I said, “is your loss, you superior animal. Ruskin says
somewhere, and quite truly, that who cannot sympathize with the lower
cannot sympathize with the higher.”
Now Virginia plunged off into a stream of delightful nonsense, told us
how she sometimes loved and sometimes hated herself, how, if she was
very happy, she had to pay the penalty of reaction, and how interesting
she was, altogether. As a punishment we made her keep still for five
minutes by the watch. I hoped Alfred would talk instead. Suppose we
punished him by making him talk for five minutes!
Florence said: “What I like most of all is to be liked. I often envy
people their lovableness.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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