It is true of some of these senses that in their enjoyment the stimulus itself is consumed. Whenever this is the case the sense concerned will be found to be one of the so-called lower, unæsthetic senses. Not only is social experience of the enjoyable object impossible, but even the single individual cannot himself get the experience again. Can it be, perhaps, that, as Thorndike remarks, “the pleasures of taste are not called æsthetic because one cannot eat his cake and have it, too”? It begins now to look as though only those sense impressions can become æsthetic vehicles which somehow lead beyond themselves, and beyond the immediate gratification of the individual, and facilitate some sort of social operation, or conference, or participation. In saying this we do not have reference to the doctrine that one often hears emphasized,—viz., that the lower senses, such as taste, are low and unæsthetic because they minister mainly to our personal and physiological needs. Nothing could be farther from the truth. It is not because taste, smell, and touch are mainly concerned in telling us of facts that are of fundamental vital importance to us as individuals that they are low or unæsthetic, but only because they do nothing more than this,—because they cannot become the vehicle of our individual and social conference and communication. In this connection let me quote an illuminating comment from Miss Calkins’ chapter on “Perception” in her “Introduction to Psychology.” As she there writes: