Mafikeng (South Africa) -- History -- Siege, 1899-1900 -- Personal narratives, British
Our guns moved into position during the night, throwing up
emplacements for the attack, and as soon as they could see, Major
Panzera opened fire. It was yet dark, although there came a faint
glimmer of light from the east, but not sufficient to prevent the
flashes from the muzzles of the guns and the glow of the bursting
shells from being plainly visible. Until that moment there had been no
sign of any living thing about the veldt between us and the Boer
lines, and there was no sound. We had seen C and D Squadrons creeping
to their positions under the guidance of the scout Cooke. Captain Lord
Charles Bentinck had deployed across the front of the Boer position,
taking up his place upon the left of the line. Close to him and but
little in advance, the gunners had ensconced themselves behind a few
sods of earth and sacks of sand. These operations marked the
preliminary of the fight, from which, as the armoured train steamed to
its post, completing the units in our attack, nothing had been omitted
which might increase our chances of success.
At 4.15 a.m. our first shells were thrown upon the enemy's position,
the shells bursting short and beyond Game Tree with no very striking
effect. Upon the left of Game Tree and extending to the receding wall
of the fort, some sixty yards distant, there was a heavy overgrowth of
bushes, upon which, as the enemy seemed to be firing from concealed
pits in their midst, the cavalry Maxim concentrated its fire. Away to
the right there was the automatic rattle of the Maxim in the armoured
train, and the sharp crack of the Hotchkiss. For the first
three-quarters of an hour the attack was left to Major Panzera, who,
it was hoped, would effect a breach in the parapet through the agency
of his guns. But, unfortunately, the damage inflicted upon the fort
did not materially aid the charge which our men were so soon and so
very gallantly to make, and which, when completed, revealed the fact
that Colonel Baden-Powell had also organised a frontal attack upon an
entrenched and impregnable position, with most lamentable results. A
few of the enemy were put out of action by our shrapnel shells
bursting in such a manner as to search out the interior of the fort
with their sharp-edged segments, but the strength of the fort was so
great and had been so increased during the night, that the artillery
which was available was not sufficiently heavy for our purpose, while
the wisdom of using the guns at all is eminently questionable. The
character of our attack needed a movement which was quietly delivered,
and which was in the nature of a surprise. So far as the fact is of
value, in appreciating the appalling disaster which upon that morning
befell our arms, our gunfire simply warned the garrison in the fort to
stand to their arms. There is no doubt that the employment of the guns
was a blunder in keeping with the conception of the attack. Colonel
Baden-Powell, one has to say regretfully, upon this occasion was
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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