The detachment of Police, who formed the garrison at Cannon Kopje, upon this day performed a most brilliant service for the town by their determined and gallant stand. Perhaps in war more than in anything else, chance is a greater arbiter than we like to consider, and if it had not been for the chance attack against Cannon Kopje, which resulted in the defeat of the Boer forces, it is not improbable that Mafeking itself would have been invaded by the enemy. The subjugation of this point, in reality the turning point in the siege, was, however, of vital concern to Commandant Cronje, since it had been his intention to bombard the south-east portion of the town, and to carry it with a large force which he had assembled during the night in the adjacent valley of the Molopo River. When day had dawned, the look-out from Cannon Kopje had already reported to Colonel Walford that there was unusual activity in the Boer camp; at the moment this was stirring news, and indeed the fatigues for the night had been barely dismissed when an experimental shell from the Boer artillery to test the range, opened the action. During the night, and about the close of Sunday, the enemy's artillery had taken up their position, and as the grey of dawn ushered in the fatal day, a large force of Boers moved out from their laager and occupied any point by which they might command the area of the fort. It seemed to me, as I witnessed their disposition, that at least a third of the forces before Mafeking had been concentrated upon Cannon Kopje, and if so great a tragedy had not attended the action, we could have afforded to laugh at the efforts of an enemy so hopelessly incompetent as the Boer force has proved itself to be. Against a mere gun emplacement and forty-four men, shell fire from four guns was directed, and the services of eight hundred men utilised. In the extreme west there was "Big Ben" and a seven-pounder; in the extreme east there was a twelve-pounder. Within a circle from these two points, and within effective range, a seven-pounder and quick-firing Maxim-Nordenfeldt had been stationed. The big gun took no part at all in this attack upon the kopje, but at every moment that the enemy's shell fire lapsed, the Boer marksmen opened with their Mauser rifles. Their rifle fire stretched from the extremities of either flank and enfiladed the interior trenches of the kopje. Nothing perhaps in the history of their operations along this frontier, was so calculated to prove successful as the Boer attack upon Cannon Kopje. They had the guns, the men, and they held all commanding points, while they themselves were snugly ensconced behind cover almost impervious to shell fire. With these advantages it would seem morally impossible that forty-four men could withstand the unceasing stream of shells, the mist of bullets, which comprised the zone of fire of which the kopje was the centre. Had these men wavered, such a thing is easy to explain; had they fallen back upon the town,