is the first good to be considered as the same with intellect, nor must it be admitted that the intelligible is more ancient than all the hyparxis of the whole of things, since it is even subordinate to the light proceeding from _the good_, and being perfected by this light, is conjoined according to its own order with _the good itself_. For we must not say that the intelligible is united to the first after the same manner as the light [of truth;] but the latter through continuity with _the good_ is established in it without a medium; while the former, through this light, participates of a vicinity to _the good_; since in sensibles also, the solar light is primarily connascent with the circulation of the sun, ascends as far as to the centre of the whole sphere, and subsists on all sides about it. But all sensible natures through this obtain a similitude to the sun, each of them according to its own nature being filled with solar-form illumination. These things, therefore, will be sufficient to recall into the memory of those who love the contemplation of truth, the conceptions of Plato on this subject, and to evince that the order of intellect is secondary to the exempt transcendency of _the one_. If, however, it is requisite to evince the same thing through many testimonies, let us survey what the Elean guest in the Sophista determines concerning these things. He says, therefore, it is necessary that the multitude of all beings, whether they are contraries or not, should be suspended from the one being, [i.e. from being characterized by the one;] but that the one being itself should be suspended from _the one_. For when we call the hot or the cold, or permanency or motion, being, we do not denominate each of these as the same with being itself. For if permanency were being itself, motion would not be being; or, if motion were such like being, permanency would not participate of the appellation of being. But it is evident that being accedes to permanency, to motion, and to every multitude of beings from one thing which is primarily being. This very thing, therefore, which is the cause of essence to all things, and which is participated by all other things, is a participant of this one, and on this account, as it is being alone, so also it is primarily being.[147] It is, however, being itself indeed, and is not allotted _to be_, from participation; but it is one according to participation, and on this account it is passive to _the one_. But it is being[148] primarily. If, therefore, Plato gives to _the one_ a subsistence beyond being, in the same manner as that which is first in wholes is supposed by him to transcend beings, how is it possible that being should not be posterior to _the one_, since it participates of it, and on this account is denominated one?