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The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning Proclus

Philosophy

The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning

Name: The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Author: Proclus

Proclus

Neoplatonism -- Early works to 1800; Plato -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- Early works to 1800

It is far therefore from being the case, that Parmenides, who places
the science of beings above that which appears to be truth to those
who rank sense before intellect, should introduce doxastic knowledge
to an intellective nature, since a knowledge of this kind is dubious,
various, and unstable; or that he should speculate true being with this
doxastic wisdom, and inane discussion. For a various form of knowledge
does not harmonize[98] with that which is simple, nor the multiform
with the uniform, nor the doxastic with the intelligible.

But still further, nor must this be omitted, that such a mode of
discourse is perfectly foreign from the discussion of Parmenides. For
he discourses about all beings, and delivers the order of wholes, their
progression beginning from _the one_, and their conversion ending
in the one. But the argumentative method is very remote from scientific
theory. Does it not therefore appear, that Plato must have attributed
a discordant hypothesis to Parmenides, if it be said that he merely
regards an exercise through opposite arguments, and that for the sake
of the power employed in this exercise, he excites the whole of this
evolution of reasons? Indeed, it will be found that in all the other
dialogues, Plato attributes hypotheses to each of the philosophers
adapted to their peculiar tenets. Thus to Timæus, he assigns the
doctrine about nature; to Socrates, that of a republic; to the Elean
guest, that about being; and to the priestess Diotima, that respecting
love. Afterwards, each of the other dialogues confines itself to those
arguments which are adapted to the writings of the principal person
of the dialogue. But Parmenides alone will appear to us wise in his
poems, and in his diligent investigation of true being, but in the
Platonic scene, he will be the leader of a juvenile muse. This opinion,
therefore, accuses Plato of dissimilitude of imitation, though he
himself condemns the poets, for ascribing to the sons of the Gods a
love of money, and a life subject to the dominion of the passions. How,
therefore, can we refer a discussion of doxastic and empty arguments to
the leader of the truth of beings?

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