The social contract & discoursesRousseau, Jean-Jacques
Philosophy
The social contract & discourses
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
Economics; Political science -- Early works to 1800; Social contract
Another no less important fact is that the losses of the poor are much
harder to repair than those of the rich, and that the difficulty of
acquisition is always greater in proportion as there is more need for
it. "Nothing comes out of nothing," is as true of life as in physics:
money is the seed of money, and the first guinea is sometimes more
difficult to acquire than the second million. Add to this that what
the poor pay is lost to them for ever, and remains in, or returns to,
the hands of the rich: and as, to those who share in the government
or to their dependents, the whole produce of the taxes must sooner or
later pass, although they pay their share, these persons have always a
sensible interest in increasing them.
The terms of the social compact between these two estates of men may
be summed up in a few words. "You have need of me, because I am rich
and you are poor. We will therefore come to an agreement. I will permit
you to have the honour of serving me, on condition that you bestow on
me the little you have left, in return for the pains I shall take to
command you."
Putting all these considerations carefully together, we shall find
that, in order to levy taxes in a truly equitable and proportionate
manner, the imposition ought not to be in simple ratio to the property
of the contributors, but in compound ratio to the difference of
their conditions and the superfluity of their possessions. This very
important and difficult operation is daily made by numbers of honest
clerks, who know their arithmetic; but a Plato or a Montesquieu would
not venture to undertake it without the greatest diffidence, or
without praying to Heaven for understanding and integrity.
Another disadvantage of personal taxes is that they may be too much
felt or raised with too great severity. This, however, does not prevent
them from being frequently evaded; for it is much easier for persons to
escape a tax than for their possessions.
Of all impositions, that on land, or real taxation, has always been
regarded as most advantageous in countries where more attention is
paid to what the tax will produce, and to the certainty of recovering
the product, than to securing the least discomfort for the people. It
has been even maintained that it is necessary to burden the peasant
in order to rouse him from indolence, and that he would never work
if he had no taxes to pay. But in all countries experience confutes
this ridiculous notion. In England and Holland the farmer pays very
little, and in China nothing: yet these are the countries in which the
land is best cultivated. On the other hand, in those countries where
the husbandman is taxed in proportion to the produce of his lands, he
leaves them uncultivated, or reaps just as much from them as suffices
for bare subsistence. For to him who loses the fruit of his labour, it
is some gain to do nothing. To lay a tax on industry is a very singular
expedient for banishing idleness.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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