San Martin retreated on Santiago practically unmolested. The first news of the disaster was carried to the capital by fugitive officers. They reported that San Martin was killed and O'Higgins mortally wounded, and everything lost. Shouts of "Viva el rey" resounded through the streets; leading citizens opened communication with Osorio, and the republicans prepared for flight to Mendoza or Valparaiso. But the next day word came that San Martin himself was safe; and the day following a despatch saying he had four thousand men under his orders. With O'Higgins's arrival in the city the revolutionary disorders were suppressed, and soon San Martin rode into the city. Though half dead through loss of sleep, as he drew rein at his house he made the one speech of his life, laconically assuring the people that he expected to win the next battle, and that right soon. [Illustration: NATIVE COSTUMES IN CHILE ABOUT 1840.] Not forgetting precautions which ensured a safe retreat to the northern provinces or the Argentine, he devoted himself to re-organising the army, and within ten days after its dispersal had five thousand men together, well provided and resolute to give a good account of themselves. He took a position on a low line of chalk hills seven miles south-west of Santiago, and waited for the enemy, whose numbers were now slightly superior to his own. Meanwhile the Spanish officers were greatly disappointed at the negative results of Cancha-Rayada; mutual reproaches flew back and forth in their council of war; many advocated maintaining the defensive and even retreating to the south to be nearer their base. Their indecision gave San Martin the needed opportunity to gather his dispersed forces and to inspire them with his own confidence. Finally, however, Osorio advanced cautiously on Santiago, hoping that the Argentine would not risk another battle for the defence of the capital, and manoeuvring to the west so as to get between the city and the sea. In front of San Martin's position lay another line of chalk hills, separated from the first by a narrow stretch of low ground. At their western end ran the road from Santiago to Valparaiso. Like the Union position at Gettysburg this line of hills was admirably adapted for a defensive battle, and Osorio resolved to occupy it, especially as he thought his left wing extended far enough west to command the Valparaiso road, thereby securing him a communication with a new and more convenient base on the coast and giving him a line of retreat in case of a reverse. But San Martin's quick eye saw that this opinion was mistaken; and that his opponent might easily be cut off.