The South American Republics, Part 2 of 2Dawson, Thomas Cleland
History
The South American Republics, Part 2 of 2
Dawson, Thomas Cleland
South America -- History
When this treaty was submitted to the Colombian Senate for ratification,
opposition developed which the administration was not strong or resolute
enough to overcome. Among the politicians at Bogota, the opinion was
almost universal that the executive should have demanded more. The
Colombian people have ever regarded the political control of the Isthmus
as their most valuable national heritage, and cherished extravagant
hopes that some day they would be vastly enriched by the sale or rental
of this strategic bit of ground for its natural use as the greatest
artery of the world's commerce. Many now insisted, as they had done in
1898, on enforcing a forfeiture of the French rights, or at least on
receiving a proportion of the $40,000,000 to be paid for them. It was
also said that the Americans could well afford a larger bonus, and the
opponents of the treaty made the further point that the agreement was
unconstitutional and contained insufficient guaranties of Colombian
sovereignty. Against this storm the feeble administration probably could
do little and certainly did nothing. The Senate was allowed to adjourn
without ratifying the treaty, and an attempt was made to negotiate a new
one providing for a larger bonus and more stringent guarantees of
Colombian sovereignty.
The United States, however, absolutely refused to consider any other
terms than those already agreed upon, and the civilised world saw the
completion of an enterprise promising incalculable benefits to mankind
indefinitely postponed by the opposition of Andean provinces whom the
accidents of war and international politics had given an arbitrary
control over a region with which they had no natural connection. The
situation was particularly hard for the people of the Isthmus, whose
confident hopes were now disappointed of at last receiving, by the
prosperity which would follow the building of the canal, some
compensation for the oppression and losses they had suffered during
eighty years of misrule by the Bogota oligarchies. Hardly had the treaty
been rejected when plotting for a declaration of independence began. The
resident population was unanimous, and good grounds existed for
believing that even the Colombian garrison would offer no resistance
unless reinforcements should come from Bogota. In case of an armed
conflict with Colombia the people of Panama could count on the sympathy
of all America and Europe. The stockholders of the French Company had a
direct pecuniary interest in their success. If once they could establish
independence and a _de facto_ government, Colombia could not deliver an
effective attack without violating the neutrality and security of
transit guaranteed to the Isthmus by the United States. Everything
pointed to the success of a well-conducted movement.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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