There is _not enough compression_ in some parts. In this volume, it is true, not a tithe of the statute law is quoted, that over-burthens the former one: but when he does cite a statute, the author still gives it to us in all the exuberance of legislative verbosity. Thus, he fills the third part of a page with the law of _lapsing legacies_; (p. 91) when, considering that only the _substance_ was essential--especially as every owner of the book may be supposed to have the Code also--it might more clearly, and as satisfactorily, have been couched in five lines, as follows: "When a legatee or devisee, descended from the testator, dies before him, leaving any descendant who survives him; the legacy or devise shall vest in such surviving descendant, as if the legatee or devisee had survived the testator, and then died unmarried and intestate." And he takes _three quarters of a page_ (copied from the Revised Code) to say that "a surety may in writing notify the creditor to sue upon the bond, bill, or note, which binds the surety; and unless the creditor sue in reasonable time, and proceed with due diligence to recover the sum due, the surety shall be exonerated." (pp. 132, 133.) In the name of all that is reasonable, why should not a writer disencumber his pages of the rubbish of _howbeit_, _provided_, _nevertheless_, _notwithstanding_, and _aforesaid_, when, by doing so, he might save himself and his readers so much time and toil? Some quarrel, too, we have, with the _judicial_ law, which principally fills the book. It is too _mere a digest of cases_. A head in the Table of Contents refers us to a page, where we expect to find a full elementary exposition of at least the leading doctrines that fall under that head: but we see perhaps only a single _case_, or a judge's _dictum_, not at all realizing the promise of the reference, by unfolding all pertinent general principles. Thus, under the caption, "WHEN A STATEMENT OF A TRANSACTION MUST BE TAKEN ALTOGETHER," instead of finding a general rule laid down on the point indicated, we find only a case briefly stated, from which we are left to deduce a rule, _if we can_. (pp. 329, 330.) Under the very next head, the well established principle, that 'an Answer is no evidence for the defendant, as to any thing it affirms, not responsive to the allegations of the Bill, but that it _is_ evidence, so far as it responds to those allegations'--is whittled away to the position, that it is not evidence as to any affirmative matter, touching which the Bill _seeks no discovery_. Now, if the Bill positively alleges one thing (whether it calls for a _discovery_ or not,) and the answer as positively alleges the reverse; such denial stands for proof, and must be rebutted by testimony: and so, we conceive, do the cases clearly evince, which are cited by our author himself; _Beckwith_ v. _Butler_, _Paynes_ v. _Coles_ (see 1 Munf. 379, 389, 397,) and even _Taylor_ v.