which might affect that body, and I doubt not he meant to require firmness in obedience to instructions against the wishes of the House of Representatives as much as in any thing else. In the Virginia Convention he heard loud calls for the protection of the right, yet never denied its existence. Suppose a question arises in the House of Representatives dangerous to a state. It is carried in that body by passion or faction against such manifestations of popular will as can be given. It is believed the Senators will go the same way. The people have no resource left, but instructions through their State Legislature. If this has no effect, our servants are our masters, and we are ruled by an oligarchy the more odious, because it presents us with a mockery of representation. But it seems that Mr. Madison thinks the Senate “may be sometimes necessary as a defence _to the people_ against _their own temporary errors and delusions_; he justly applauds the _salutary interference_ in critical moments, of some respectable and temperate body of citizens, to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow mediated by _the people against themselves_, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind.” This is correct reasoning, but it cannot apply to the States or their Legislatures, but must allude to the people of the Union and the House of Representatives. The Senate cannot defend the people of any state from their _own temporary delusions_, or afford a _salutary interference_ with the proceedings of a State Legislature. The latter body is supposed competent to act for itself, and not to require the _protection_ of the United States Senate, and still less of an _individual Senator_. This argument might be urged _in favor_ of a Senator instructing a State Legislature, with more propriety than _against_ the reverse operation, because under the present system the State Legislatures have no connection with the United States Senators unless they instruct them, and thus if they choose to be wilful and refuse to instruct them, which by this new construction would be to ask his advice, they may ruin the people by their temporary errors and delusions, without ever giving their Senator the power to save them by the salutary interference of his “respectable and temperate” mandate.