Mr. Madison is here again providing against a rottenness in the Senate, which would not only set instructions at defiance, but every moral and political duty. He says, in effect, “you are afraid of a six years tenure, but you need not fear that, because at any given period only one third can have that duration, one third will hold for four, and one only for two years. Fear of not being re-elected, or a decreasing interest in the usurped power, will prevent them from corruption, tyranny, disobedience, and other iniquities. If all were at the same time tyrants of six years duration, you would be in danger; but the shortening term of some, and the hope that others will stay honest, is your protection. The honest ones will obey you from principle, the corrupt from fear.” This I conceive to be his opinion written out. For, says Mr. Nicholas in his presence, “we can instruct them”—and Patrick Henry says, in effect, “If they are bad men they will not obey—we ought to have a power of impeachment or recall, to make them obey; the rotation is not in my opinion sufficient surety of their obedience.” In those days goodness was thought to ensure obedience, but now it is thought if they are good men, “bound by all the ties of integrity and honor to a faithful discharge of their duty,” they will not obey, or need not, because so intelligent and so good—as if obedience was not the highest duty, or misrepresentation was the part of a faithful representative. But let us look to the Federalist as we did to Dr. Johnson, in behalf of the other party. We find MR. MADISON, as well as his great coadjutors, HAMILTON and JAY, speaking of the Senate, not as a little oligarchy, or Holy Alliance of absolute sovereigns for six years, but as an assembly of the _States_. Measures, says he, will have to be approved first by a majority of the people, and then by a majority of the _States_. The States will be interested in preventing this, or carrying that. Thus again indicating the necessity of giving the _States_ an influence over the _people of the Union_. Among the reasons for giving the elections to the State Legislatures, he says it not only favored a select appointment, “but gives to the State _governments_ such an agency in the formation of the federal government, as _must secure the authority of the former_, and may form a convenient link between the two systems.” The link is formed by the election, but if the Senators then become independent and firm against their constituents, what _secures the authority_? The federal argument supposes the Senator at the moment of his election, to lose all connection with his State, and become entirely a federal officer, representing all the United States. If this is true, how is State authority secured by his election? Mr. Madison's argument in favor of the Senate, based upon the assertion that every resolution or law will have to pass first a majority of the people, and then a majority of