The Southern Literary Messenger, Vol. II., No. 10, September, 1836Various
General
The Southern Literary Messenger, Vol. II., No. 10, September, 1836
Various
American literature -- 19th century -- Periodicals
The Judge contends that we must extend our doctrine to cases of
impeachment, or give it up. It must embrace every thing or nothing. If
the State Legislature has the power of exception, it may instruct in
some cases of impeachment, and forbear in others. It may instruct to
condemn or acquit. If the Senator can make the exceptions, then says
the Judge, this power is an _empty name_. This is too true. The
Senator can have no power to make exceptions, and yet under this
assumed right nine-tenths of the disobedience which has ever been
committed has been cloaked. The Judge has never heard whether
impeachments were included in the doctrine, because he is the first
person who ever broached that doctrine. When the Senate sits as a
court of impeachment, or upon executive appointments, they cease to be
our _representatives_, they become ex officio jurors or councillors of
State, and in either capacity we have no more right to instruct them
than we have to instruct the Chief Justice, or the President. They
cease to be Legislators, and belong for the time to the Executive, or
Judicial departments. In both cases private rights are concerned,
character and opinion is involved, and evidence may be taken. Judgment
is to be given and not a law passed. We can instruct to do an act, but
not to form an opinion—to vote, but not to give judgment as to fitness
for office, or the propriety of rejecting an officer. We do not see
the force of the Judge's reasoning which forces our doctrine to apply
to impeachments. The Senator acts in two capacities, as distinct as if
they were held by two individuals. They are held up in the Federalist
as judicious exceptions to the maxims which require the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments to be separate. The Senator takes
a new oath in trying impeachments. We have no more right to instruct
our Senators when made judges or councillors by the constitution, than
when made permanent judges or ministers or heads of department by the
President. And the inability to instruct in the latter cases, had as
well be brought up against us as in the former, as a reason for not
instructing them when acting as _our representatives_. We can _will_
an act to be done, _but not_ that the innocent are guilty, or the
reverse. The Judge's definition ought to have exceptions for these
cases, unless he holds them as all others do, as excluded _of course_
by their nature from the controversy.
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