“But whom in that case would they represent? Not the legislatures of the states, but the people. This would totally obliterate the federal features of the constitution. What would become of the _state governments_, and on whom would devolve the duty of defending them against the encroachments of the federal government? A consolidation of the states would ensue, which it is conceded would subvert the new constitution, and against which this very article, so much condemned, is our best security. Too much provision cannot be made against a consolidation. The state governments represent the wishes and feelings and local interests of the people. They are the safeguard and ornament of the constitution—they will protract the period of our liberties—they will afford a shelter against the abuse of power, and will be the natural avengers of our violated rights. “A very effectual check upon the power of the senate is provided. A third part is to retire from office every two years. By this means, while the senators are seated for six years they are admonished of their _responsibility to the state legislatures_. If one third new members are introduced, who feel the sentiments of their states, they will awe that third whose term will be near expiring. This article seems to be an excellence of the constitution, and affords just ground to believe that it will be in practice, as in theory, a _federal_ republic.” The remarks of Mr. King in the _same convention_, upon the same subject, lead irresistibly to this conclusion, although it was attempted to be reasoned away by Judge H. in his first letter—“The senators,” said Mr. K. “will have a _powerful check_, in those men who wish for their seats, who will _watch_ their whole conduct in the general government, and will _give the alarm_ in case of misbehavior.” (This is one distinct check and Mr. K. proceeds.) “And the _state legislatures_, if they find _their delegates_ erring, can and will _instruct them. Will not this be a check?_ When they hear the voice of the people _solemnly dictating_ to them _their duty_, they will be bold men indeed to act _contrary to it_.” (This makes obedience a _duty_, and the boldness and hardihood not of that virtuous kind which the Judge supposes.) “These will not be instructions sent them in a private letter, which can be put in their pockets; they will be public instructions, which all the country will see; and they will be hardy men indeed to violate them.” (This seems to suppose meanness enough to violate secret instructions, but not audacity enough to violate them in the face of day.) “The honorable gentleman said, _the power to control the senate is as great as ever was enjoyed in any government;_ and that the members thereof will be found _not to be chosen for too long a time_. They are, says he, to assist the executive in the designation and appointment of officers; and they ought to have time to mature their judgment.