If for a shorter period, how can they be acquainted with the rights and interests of nations, so as to _form advantageous treaties_?” If this is not our doctrine in full, we give it up. Here is length of term advocated, not to strengthen in disobedience, but to _mature judgment as to officers_, and _acquire information as to treaties_; but as to legislative proceedings, “if they are found erring, instruct them.” Instructions are given as the remedy for a term _too long_ for _legislators_, but necessary to enable them to execute properly their executive duties. A similar view was taken by _Mr. Parsons_ of _Newburyport_, who thought “suitable checks had been provided to prevent an abuse of power, and to continue _their dependance on their constituents_.” _Mr. Neal_ asks, “If we should ratify the constitution and _instruct_ our first members to congress, &c. &c., is there not the highest probability that every thing which we wish may be effectually secured?” _Mr. Symmes_ finally withdrew his opposition, and would, “especially as the amendments were to be a _standing instruction_ to their _delegates_, until they were obtained, give it his unreserved assent.” So in the _New York convention, Mr. Hamilton_ says, “It will be the interest of the large _states_ to increase the representation. This will be the _standing instruction_ to their delegates.” He then argues at length to prove that the will of the people must prevail over that of the members of congress, and thus speaks: “If the general voice of the people be for an increase, it undoubtedly must take place. They have it in their power _to instruct their representatives_; and the state legislatures, _which appoint the senators_, may _enjoin_ it also upon them.” In the same convention, _Mr. Jay_ says, “The senate is to be composed of men appointed by the state legislatures: they will certainly choose those who are most distinguished for their general knowledge; I presume they will also _instruct them_; that there will be a _constant correspondence_ supported between the senators and the _state executive_, who will be able, from time to time, to afford them all that particular information which particular circumstances may require.” He seems to have considered senators in the light of _ambassadors_, and never to have contemplated the contingency of a state executive's refusing to send instructions to senators! There was an attempt made in this convention to carry an amendment, making senators ineligible for more than six years in a term of twelve, and subjecting them to a power of recall, but it was negatived—its opponents alleging that the _states_ had as much power of _control_ as any constituents ought to have, or as the _people_ had in the other house, and that to render senators ineligible a second term would be highly impolitic—excluding useful and experienced citizens from office.