As to the _first_, even Blackstone admits that members of Parliament ought to obey if they represented separate communities, and did not serve for the whole realm. He says, “every member is chosen for the whole, and hence is not bound, like a deputy in the United Provinces, to consult his particular constituents.” But here they are elected for _states_, by analogy to the old congress and the diet of the United Provinces.[4] MR. HAMILTON says in the Federalist, (No. 9,) “The proposed constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the state governments, makes _them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate_, and leaves to their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power.” MR. MADISON says, in No. 45, “The _state governments_ may be regarded as _constituent_ and essential parts of the federal government.” MR. LANSING, who had been a member of the federal convention, said in the New York convention, “I believe it was undoubtedly _the intention of the framers of this constitution_ to make the lower house the proper, peculiar representative of the interests of the people—the senate of the _sovereignty of the states_.” For this reason he wished a power of recall to make them more dependent upon their states, “of whose independence it was _designed by the plan_ that they should be the bulwark, and check to the encroachments of the general government.” MR. SMITH, in the same convention, was also very apprehensive of senatorial disobedience, and advocated Mr. Lansing's amendment. He says, “with respect to the second part of the amendment, I would observe, that as the senators are the _representatives of the state legislatures_, it is reasonable and proper that they should be _under their control_. When _a state sends an agent_ commissioned to transact _any business_, or perform _any service_, it certainly ought to have a power to recall him.” I presume this authority, with that in a previous note, will sufficiently establish this point. [Footnote 4: “In Switzerland and _Holland_ the different parties (states) send deputies, commissioned and _instructed_ by themselves, who debate, but have no other power than what is conferred only by the people, or may be subsequently given.” (_Harrington_, _Oceana_, 51.) This bears a close resemblance to the powers of the old congress.] II. As to the second reason, it received sufficient consideration in my former number.[5]