III. If any thing could render a relaxation of our rule tolerable in England, it would be that feature of their constitution which will not permit resignation. As that constitution “will not intend a wrong,” it must suppose constituents utterly incapable of giving instructions “which no honest man can obey”—and it must hold a member entirely irresponsible, morally and legally, for a vote in obedience to them. Such is the fact, and this arrangement prevents that possibility of the defeat of their wishes by resignation, which the judge so much deprecates, and which he sets up as a reason or excuse for wilful disobedience. This absence of a constitutional privilege of resignation renders members, when once elected, indebted entirely to the courtesy of the crown for their escape from their seats when disagreeable. Another feature of their constitution makes the acceptance of office under the crown, (except a few offices of state) _ipso facto_ vacate a seat in parliament. Hence we often hear of gentlemen's accepting the Chiltern Hundreds.[6] [Footnote 6: “A member when duly elected, is not only compelled to serve in parliament, but he cannot at any future period either resign his seat or be expelled from the house except by some legal disqualification. In order, therefore, to meet the views of those members who may wish to resign their seats, it has been the practice, ever since the year 1750, for such members to accept {690} the office of steward of the Chiltern Hundreds, which being an appointment under the crown, their seats are of necessity vacated. The office, however, is a merely nominal one. The stewards who accept it desire neither honor nor emolument from it, the only salary attached to the appointment being twenty shillings a year. The Chiltern Hundreds are districts in Buckinghamshire belonging to the crown. The appointment to the office of the steward of these Hundreds is vested in the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, as a matter of course, grants it to every member who applies for it.”—_Random Recollections of the House of Commons_. “On the 2d of March, 1623, (!) it is agreed, That a man, after he is duly chosen, cannot relinquish.” See this and other precedents, and the reasons for the principle on which this part of the parliamentary constitution stands, collected in “Volume II of Hatsell's Proceedings and Precedents in the House of Commons.” The rule is firmly established, but thus easily evaded when inconvenient.]