of different species do not understand each other until they have been together for some time. Each one learns to understand the speech of the other; but, as a rule, he does not try to speak it. When he deigns an answer, it is usually in his own tongue. The more fixed and pronounced the social and gregarious instincts are in any species, the higher the type of its speech. They often utter certain sounds under certain conditions in a whisper, which indicates they are conscious of the effect which will result from the use of speech. Monkeys reason from cause to effect, communicate to others the conclusion deduced therefrom, and act in accordance therewith. If their sounds convey a fixed idea on a given subject from one mind to another, what more does human speech accomplish? If one sound communicates that idea clearly, what more could volumes do? If their sounds discharge all the functions of speech, in what respect are they not speech? [Sidenote: CANNOT THINK WITHOUT WORDS] It is as reasonable to attribute meaning to their sounds as to attribute motives to their actions; and the fact that they ascribe a meaning to the sounds of human speech, would show that they are aware that ideas can be conveyed by sounds. If they can interpret certain sounds of human speech, they can ascribe a meaning to their own. They think, and speech is but the natural exponent of thought; it is the audible expression of thought, and signs are the visible expression of the same; born of the same cause, acts to the same end, and discharges the same functions in the economy of life. To reason is to think methodically; and if it be true that man cannot think without words, the same must be true of monkeys. I do not mean, however, to claim that such is a fact with regard to man thinking; but if such can be shown to be a fact, it will decide the question as to the invention of human speech, as it was necessary for man to think in order to invent; and, by the same rule, he could not think a word which did not exist, and therefore could not have invented it. But I beg to be allowed to stand aside and let Prof. Max Müller and Prof. Whitney, the great giants of comparative philology, settle this question between themselves; and I shall abide by the verdict which may be finally reached. But theories are useless things when the facts are known; and since I have actually learned from a monkey a certain sound having a certain value and meaning a certain thing, and by repeating that sound to a monkey of the same species have met with uniform results, have understood him, and been understood by him, no argument could be so potent as to cause me to believe that this was accident. I am aware that coincidents occur; but when they become the rule instead of the exception, they are no longer mere coincidents, but are the normal state of things. [Sidenote: THOUGHT AND REASON]