“He had never turned sheep in his life; but as soon as he discovered that it was his duty to do so, and that it obliged me, I can never forget with what anxiety and eagerness he _learned_ his different evolutions; he would try every way, deliberately, till he found out what I wanted him to do; and when once I made him _understand_ a direction, he never mistook or forgot it. Well as I knew him, he often astonished me, for when hard pressed, in accomplishing the task which was set him, he had expedients of the moment that bespoke _a great share of the reasoning faculty_.” John Locke, the distinguished writer on metaphysical questions, says:-- “Birds’ learning of tunes, and the endeavors one may observe in them to hit the notes right, put it past doubt with me that they have perception, and retain ideas in their _memories_, and use them for patterns.... It seems as evident to me that they [brutes] _do reason as that they have sense_.” Pritchard, On the Vital Principle, says:-- “Sensation is an attribute of the mind, and the possession of mind certainly extends as far as its phenomena. Whatever beings have conscious feeling, have, unless the preceding arguments amount to nothing, souls, or immaterial minds, distinct from the substance of which they appear to us to be composed. _If all animals feel, all animals have souls._” H. H. Dobney, Future Punishment, p. 101, says:-- “While consciousness, reason, and the sense of right and wrong, are among the highest attributes of man, these in a degree are allowed to be possessed by some at least of the brute creation. Dr. Brown, according to his biographer, Dr. Welsh, ‘believed that many of the lower animals have the sense of right and wrong; and that the metaphysical argument which proves the immortality of man, extends with equal force to the other orders of earthly existence.’” Similar views are attributed to Coleridge and Cudworth. Dalton, in his treatise on Human Physiology, p. 428, says:-- “The possession of this kind of intelligence and reasoning power, is not confined to the human species. We have already seen that there are many instinctive actions in man as well as in animals. It is no less true that, in the higher animals, there is often _the same exercise of reasoning power as in man_. The degree of this power is much less in them than in him, _but its nature is the same_. Whenever, in an animal, we see any action performed, with the evident intention of accomplishing a particular object, such an act is plainly the result of reasoning power, not essentially different from our own.