[63] The report of the New York State Superintendent of Banks for the same period emphasizes this point by showing a steady _contraction_ of loans by State banks and trust companies of New York City during the period quoted, while all other authorities reveal a steady _expansion_ in loans by similar institutions outside the city. [64] “The Hughes Investigation,” by Horace White, _Journal of Political Economy_ October, 1909, pp. 528–540. Mr. White quotes in this connection an article on “The Panic of 1907,” by Eugene Meyer, Jr., _Yale Review_, May, 1909, from which many facts in this chapter have been taken. [65] _Cf._ Burton, _supra_, pp. 49–50–51. [66] _Ibid._, pp. 227–8–9. [67] The panic of 1837 was caused by a great expansion of banking and bank credits, and an intense speculation in real estate. In 1830 there were 329 banks in the country with a capital of $110,000,000. In 1857 there were 788 with a capital of $290,000,000. When the crisis was subsequently examined it was found that there had been an actual shrinkage of $2,000,000,000 in the value of the assets of the country, and that $600,000,000 of indebtedness had been wiped out by bankruptcy. The panic of 1857 was due primarily to the influx of gold from California after its discovery in 1848, and to the intense passion for speculative gain which attended it. Suspension of specie payments by the banks lasted fifty-nine days. Complete recovery to the normal standard did not take place until 1860, when it was again interrupted by the events antecedent to the Civil War of 1861. The antecedents of the crisis of 1873 were identical with every other commercial crisis--namely, speculation--the act of buying with a view to selling at a higher price, and overtrading, or the act of buying and selling too much on a given capital. Most commonly these two elements are accompanied by two others, viz.--the destruction or loss of previously accumulated capital, and the rapid conversion of circulating into fixed capital. Speculation and destruction of capital usually go together in preparing the way for a crisis.--Horace White, _Fortnightly Review_, Vol. XXV, p. 819. The panic of 1893 was distinctly a currency panic. By a curious paradox it came at a time when the volume of currency was unprecedentedly large and constantly increasing. But the inception of the disaster had to do with its quality rather than its quantity. The repeal of the silver purchasing clause of the Sherman Law, November 1, 1893, restored confidence by assuring the commercial world that the existing volume of silver coin would be maintained on a parity with gold. [68] _Real Estate Record and Guide_, 1906–7. [69] Consult _Bradstreet’s_, 1907; the _Construction News_, Chicago, 1907; the _Engineering News_, 1907. [70] “The New York Stock Exchange and the Panic of 1907,” by Eugene Meyer, Jr., _Yale Review_, May, 1909.