(ἀποπροηγμένον); the third is the class of things intermediate. [711] The last is called, in the strict sense, indifferent, ἀδιάφορον. [712] It includes not only what is really indifferent, but whatever has such a slight negative or positive value that it neither enkindles desire nor aversion. Hence the terms προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον are defined to mean respectively that which has an appreciable positive or negative value. [713] Under things preferential, the Stoics include partly mental qualities and conditions, such as talents and skill, even progress towards virtue, in as far as it is not yet virtue; partly bodily advantage—beauty, strength, health, life itself; partly external goods—riches, honour, noble birth, relations, &c. Under things to be eschewed, they understand the opposite things and conditions; under things indifferent, whatever has no appreciable influence on our choice, such as the question whether the number of hairs on the head is even or uneven; whether I pick up a piece of waste paper from the floor, or leave it; whether one piece of money or another is used in [(3) Collision of modified and abstract theory.] payment of a debt. [714] Yet they drew a sharp distinction between the purely relative value of things preferential, and the absolute value of things morally good. Only the latter are really allowed to be called good, because they only, under all circumstances, are useful and necessary. Of things morally indifferent, on the other hand, the best may, under certain circumstances, be bad, and the worst—sickness, poverty, and the like—may, under certain circumstances, be useful. [715] Just as little would they allow that the independence of the wise man suffered by the recognition outside himself of a class of things preferential. For the wise man, said Chrysippus, [716] uses such things without requiring them. Nevertheless, the admission of classes of things to be preferred and to be declined obviously undermines their doctrine of the good. Between what is good and what is evil, a third group is introduced, of doubtful character; and since we have seen the term ἀδιάφορον is only applied to this group in its more extended meaning, it became impossible for them to refuse to apply the term good to things desirable, [717] or to exclude unconditionally from the highest good many of the things which they were in the habit of pronouncing indifferent. [718] Nor was this concession merely the yielding of a term, as will appear when particular instances are considered. Not only may Seneca [719] be heard, in Aristotelian manner, defending external possessions as aids to virtue—not only Hecato, and even Diogenes, uttering ambiguous sentences as to permitted and forbidden gains [720]—not only Panætius giving expression to much that falls short of Stoic severity [721]—but even Chrysippus avows that in his opinion it is silly not to desire health, wealth, and freedom from pain, [722] and