thing to be preferred (προηγμένον) and in avoiding a thing to be eschewed. On the other hand, a perfect duty is only fulfilled by virtuous action. A virtuous life and a wish to do good constitute the only perfect duty. [731] Some confusion is introduced into this teaching by the fact that in setting up the standard for distinguishing perfect from imperfect duties, the Stoics sometimes look at the real, sometimes at the personal value, of actions, without keeping these two aspects distinct. They therefore use the terms perfect and imperfect sometimes to express the difference between conditional and unconditional duties; at other times, to express that between morality and law. [732] Far worse than the formal defect is the grouping in this division under the conception of duty things of the most varied moral character. If once things which have only a conditional value are admitted within the circle of duties, what is there to prevent their being defended, in the practical application of the Stoic teaching, on grounds altogether repugnant to the legitimate consequences of the Stoic principles? [C. Emotions.] [(1) Permitted affections.] In accordance with these admissions, the Stoic system sought in another respect to meet facts and practical wants by abating somewhat from the austerity of its demands. Consistently carried out, those demands require the unconditional extirpation of the whole sensuous nature, such as was originally expressed by the demand for apathy. But just as the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified by the admission of προηγμένα, so this demand was modified in two ways; the first elements of the forbidden emotions were allowed under other names; and whilst emotions were still forbidden, certain mental affections were permitted, and even declared to be desirable. Taking the first point, it is allowed by the Stoics that the wise man feels pain, and that at certain things he does not remain wholly calm. [733] This admission shows that their system was not identical with that of the Cynics. [734] It is not required that men should be entirely free from all mental affections, but only that they should refuse assent to them, and not suffer them to obtain the mastery. [735] With regard to the other point, they propound the doctrine of εὐπάθειαι, or rational dispositions, which, as distinct from emotions, are to be found in the wise man, and in the wise man only. Of these rational dispositions, they distinguish three chief besides several subordinate varieties. [736] Although this admission was intended to vindicate the absence of emotions in the wise man, since the permitted feelings are not emotions, still it made the boundary-line between emotions and feelings so uncertain that in practice the sharply-defined contrast between the wise and the foolish threatened wellnigh to disappear altogether. [(2) Modification of apathy.]