In relation to our fellow-men, two fundamental points are insisted on by the Stoics—the duty of justice and the duty of mercy. Cicero, without doubt following Panætius, [800] describes these two virtues as the bonds which keep human society together, [801] and, consequently, gives to each an elaborate treatment. [802] In expanding these duties, the Stoics were led by the fundamental principles of their system to most distracting consequences. On the one hand, they required from their wise men that strict justice which knows no pity and can make no allowances; [803] hence their ethical system had about it an air of austerity, and an appearance of severity and cruelty. On the other hand, their principle of the natural connection of all mankind imposed on them the practice of the most extended and unreserved charity, of beneficence, gentleness, meekness, of an unlimited benevolence, and a readiness to forgive in all cases in which forgiveness is possible. This last aspect of the Stoic teaching appears principally in the later Stoics—in Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Musonius; [804] and it is quite possible that they may have given more prominence to it than their predecessors. But the fact is there, that this aspect is due, not only to the peculiar character of these individuals, but is based on the spirit and tone of the whole system. [805] The question then naturally arises, how these two opposites may be reconciled—how stern justice may be harmonised with forgiveness and mercy. Seneca, who investigated the question fully, replies: Not severity, but only cruelty, is opposed to mercy; for no one virtue is opposed to another: a wise man will always help another in distress, but without sharing his emotion, without feeling misery or compassion; he will not indulge, but he will spare, advise, and improve; he will not remit punishments in cases in which he knows them to be deserved, but, from a sense of justice, he will take human weakness into consideration in allotting punishments, and make every possible allowance for circumstances. [806] Every difficulty is not, indeed, removed by these statements; still, those which remain apply more to the Stoic demand for apathy than to the reconciliation of the two virtues which regulate our relations to our fellow-men. [807] [(3) Friendship.]