trouble, but to have some one whom he can tend and assist, and for whom he can live and die [818]—nevertheless, this language does not meet the critical objection, that one who requires the help of another, be it only to have an object for his moral activity, cannot be wholly dependent on himself. If friendship, according to a previously quoted distinction, [819] belongs to external goods, it makes man, in a certain sense, dependent on externals. If its essence is placed in an inward disposition of friendliness, such a disposition depends on the existence of those for whom it can be felt. Besides, it involves the necessity of being reciprocated, and of finding expression in outward conduct, to such an extent that it is quite subversive of the absolute independence of the individual. [(4) The family and political life.] Nor is the friendship of the wise the only form of society which appeared to the Stoics necessary and essential. If man is intended [820] to associate with his fellow-men in a society regulated by justice and law, how can he withdraw from the most common institution—the state? If virtue does not consist in idle contemplation, but in action, how dare he lose the opportunity of promoting good and repressing evil by taking part in political life? [821] If laws further the well-being and security of the citizens, if they advance virtue and happiness, how can the wise man fail to regard them as beautiful and praiseworthy? [822] For the same reason, matrimony will command his respect. He will neither deny himself a union so natural and intimate, nor will he deprive the state of relays of men nor society of the sight of well-ordered family life. [823] Hence, in their writings and precepts, the Stoics paid great attention to the state and to domestic life. [824] In marriage they required chastity and moderation. Love was to be a matter of reason, not of emotion—not a yielding to personal attractions, nor a seeking sensual gratification. [825] As to their views on the constitution of a state, we know [826] that they prefer a mixed constitution, compounded of the three simple forms, without objecting to other forms of government. The wise man, according to Chrysippus, will not despise the calling of a prince, if his interest so require, and, if he cannot govern himself, will reside at the court and in the camp of princes, particularly of good princes. [827]