If it be then asked what is the right moral attitude, the Stoics reply: action conformable to nature and reason—in other words, virtue. Virtue, however, implies two things. On the one hand it implies the resignation of the individual to the universe, obedience to the universal law; on the other hand it implies the harmony of man with himself, the dominion of the higher over the lower nature, of reason over emotion, and the rising superior to everything which does not belong to his true nature. Both statements may be reconciled, because the law of morality is addressed only to reasonable beings, and is the law of their nature, and can only be carried into execution by their own exertions. Still, in the Stoic ethics, two currents of thought may be clearly distinguished, which from time to time come into actual collision; the one requiring the individual to live for the common good and for society, the other impelling him to live for himself only, to emancipate himself from all that is not himself, and to console himself with the feeling of virtue. The first of these tendencies impels man to seek the society of others; the second enables him to dispense with it. From the former spring the virtues of justice, sociability, love of man; from the latter, the inner freedom and happiness of the virtuous man. The former culminates in citizenship of the world; the latter in the self-sufficingness of the wise man. In as far as virtue includes everything that can be required of man, happiness depends on it alone; nothing is good but virtue, nothing is evil but vice; all that is not connected with the moral nature is indifferent. On the other hand, in as far as virtue is based on human nature, it stands on the same footing with all else that is conformable with nature. If its own peculiar value cannot be surrendered, no more can it be required that we should be indifferent to its conformity to nature, that it should not have for us some positive or negative value, or in some way affect our feelings. Therewith the doctrine of things indifferent and the wise man’s freedom from emotions begins to totter. Lastly, if we look at the way in which virtue exists in man, we arrive at different results, according as we look at its essence or its manifestation. Virtue consists in acting conformably with reason, and reason is one and undivided; hence it appears that virtue forms an undivided unity, and must be possessed whole and entire or not at all. From this proposition the contrast of the wise and foolish man, with all its bluntness and extravagances, is only a legitimate consequence. Or, again, if we look at the conditions upon which, owing to human nature, the acquisition and possession of virtue depends, the conviction is inevitable that the wise man as drawn by the Stoics never occurs in reality. Hence the conclusion is undeniable that the contrast between wise men and fools is more uncertain than it at first appeared to be. Thus all the main