[229] As shown by Prantl, 468, 171; on Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 135; Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 279, Oud. The latter rightly refers to the fact, that Chrysippus discussed the main forms of hypothetical inference at the very beginning of his doctrine of inference, Sext. Math. viii. 223. [230] Anal. Pr. 87, b: δι’ ὑποθέσεως δὲ ἄλλης, ὡς εἶπεν (Arist. Anal. Pr. i. 23, 41, a, 37) εἶεν ἂν καὶ οὓς οἱ νεώτεροι συλλογισμοὺς μόνους βούλονται λέγειν· οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ διὰ τροπικοῦ, ὡς φασὶ, καὶ τῆς προλήψεως γινόμενοι, τοῦ τροπικοῦ ἢ συνημμένου (conditional) ὄντος ἢ διεζευγμένου (disjunctive) ἢ συμπεπλεγμένου (a copulative judgment suggesting partly hypothetical judgments like the συμπεπλεγμένον in Sext. Math. viii. 235, partly negative categorical judgments which have the force of hypothetical judgments, such as: it is not at the same time A and B. Conf. Diog. 80. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 158; Matt. viii. 226. Cic. De Fato, vi. 12). By the νεώτεροι, the Stoics must be meant, for the terminology is theirs; and the Peripatetics, to whom it might otherwise apply, always considered the categorical to be the original form of judgment. See Prantl, 468, 172. [231] Such an inference was called λόγος· when it was expressed in definite terms, for instance, If it is day, it is light. The arrangement of the clauses (which were designated by numbers, and not by letters, as the Peripatetics had done), was called τρόπος· for instance, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον. A conclusion composed of both forms of expression was a λογότροπος· for instance, εἰ ζῇ Πλάτων, ἀναπνεῖ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. The premisses were called λήμματα (in contrast to ἀξίωμα which expresses a judgment independently of its position in a syllogism); or, more correctly, the major premiss was λῆμμα, the minor πρόσληψις (hence the particles δὲ γε were προσληπτικὸς σύνδεσμος, Apollon. Synt. p. 518, Bekk.). The conclusion was ἐπιφορά, also ἐπιφορικοὶ συνδεσμοί. Ibid. 519. The major premiss in a hypothetical syllogism was called τροπικόν, its two clauses being called, respectively, ἡγούμενον (as by the Peripatetics) and λῆγον (by the Peripatetics ἑπόμενον). Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 135; Math. viii. 301, 227; Alex. l.c. and p. 88, a; 109, a; 7, b; Philop. Anal. Pr. lx. a; Schol. in Arist. 170, a, 2; Ammon. on Anal. Pr. 24, b, 19; Arist. Orig. ed. Waitz, i. 45; Apul. Dog. Plat. iii. 279, Oud.; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. p. 19. [232] Alex. Anal. Pr. 116, b, after mentioning ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες συλλογισμοὶ, or inferences incomplete in point of form, such as: A = B, B = C, ∴ A = C, which is said to want as its major premiss: Two things which are equal to a third are equal to one another. On these ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες of the Stoics see l.c. 8, a; 22, b; Alex. Top. 10, Ps. Galen, Εἰς. διαλ. 59. He then continues: οὓς ὅτι μὲν μὴ λέγουσι συλλογιστικῶς συνάγειν, ὑγιῶς λέγουσι [οἱ νεώτεροι] ... ὅτι δὲ ἡγοῦνται ὁμοίους αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοῖς κατηγορικοῖς συλλογισμοῖς ... τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνουσιν.