[245] Called μονολήμματοι συλλογισμοί. Such were ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν· and ἀναπνεῖς, ζῇς ἄρα. See Alex. Top. 6, 274; Anal. Pr. 7, a, 8, a: Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 167; Math. viii. 443; Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 272, Oud.; Prantl, 477, 186. [246] Compare the remarks of Prantl, 481, on Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2; Alex. Anal. Pr. 53, b; Galen, l.c.; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 57. If Posidonius, according to the latter passage, calls analogical conclusions συνακτικοὺς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀξιώματος, and the Stoics also, according to Schol. in Hermog. Rhet. Gr. ed. Walz, vii. 6, 764, spoke of a κατὰ δύναμιν τροπικὸν, we have already met with the same thing, p. 119, 1, where an analogical conclusion was included in the ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες, which, by the addition of an ἀξίωμα, can be changed into regular conclusions. In the doctrine of proof the τόπος παράδοξος was also treated of, according to Procl. in Euclid, 103, being probably suggested by the ethical paradoxes of the Stoics. [247] Conf. Alex. Anal. Pr. 95, a; Galen. See above p. 120, 3. According to Ps. Galen, l.c. p. 58, Chrysippus wrote these treatises on Συλλογιστικαὶ ἄχρηστοι. [248] Diog. 186, mentions fallacies due to Chrysippus, which can only have been raised for the purpose of being refuted. [249] The list of his writings contains a number of treatises on fallacies, among them no less than five on the ψευδόμενος. [250] Cic. Acad. ii. 29, 93: Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint, anne multa, aliquanto prius, quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere, id est, quod ab iis dicitur ἡσυχάζειν. The same remark is made by Sext. Math. vii. 416; Pyrrh. ii. 253. The same argument was employed against other fallacies (Simpl. Cat. 6, γ). With this λόγος ἡσυχάζων (Diog. 198), Prantl, p. 489, connects ἀργὸς λόγος (Cic. De Fato, 12, 28), regarding the one as the practical application of the other, but apparently without reason. The ἀργὸς λόγος, by means of which the Stoic fatalism was reduced ad absurdum, could not of course commend itself to Chrysippus, nor is it attributed to him. [251] Prantl, pp. 485–496. [252] Sext. Math. viii. 367: ἀλλ’ οὐ δεῖ, φασὶ, πάντων ἀπόδειξιν αἰτεῖν, τινὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δυνήσεται προβαίνειν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δοθῇ τι πιστὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τυγχάνειν. Ibid. 375: ἀλλ’ εἰώθασιν ὑποτυγχάνοντες λέγειν ὅτι πίστις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐρρῶσθαι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀληθὲς εὑρίσκεσθαι ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσιν ἐπιφερόμενον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦν ἐστιν ὑγιὲς, κἀκεῖνα οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτα καθέστηκεν.