[263] Sen. Ep. 106, 4: Bonum facit, prodest enim: quod facit corpus est: bonum agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet, quæ propria sunt corporis. Quæ corporis bona sunt, corpora sunt: ergo et quæ animi sunt. Nam et hoc corpus. Bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, cum ipse sit corporalis.... Si adfectus corpora sunt et morbi animorum et avaritia, crudelitas, indurata vitia ... ergo et malitia et species ejus omnes ... ergo et bona. It is then specially remarked that the Good, i.e. virtue, works upon the body, governing it and representing itself therein. Conf. p. 128, 1. [264] Sext. Math. vii. 38: τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν οἴονταί τινες, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διαφέρειν τἀληθοῦς κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους ... οὐσία μὲν παρ’ ὅσον ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστι τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἀσώματον ὑπῆρχε. καὶ εἰκότως, φασί. τουτὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα λεκτὸν, τὸ δὲ λεκτὸν ἀσώματον· ἀνάπαλιν δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστιν παρ’ ὅσον ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν· πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικὸν ... τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχε. Similarly Pyrrh. ii. 81. See p. 92, 2. [265] Plut. Com. Not. 45, 2, p. 1084: ἄτοπον γὰρ εὖ μάλα, τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας, πρὸς δὲ ταύταις τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς μνήμας πάσας, ἔτι δὲ φαντασίας καὶ πάθη καὶ ὁρμὰς καὶ συγκαταθέσεις σώματα ποιουμένους ἐν μηδενὶ φάναι κεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. ... οἱ δ’ οὐ μόνον τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ζῷα εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ πάθη μόνον, ὀργὰς καὶ φθόνους καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, οὐδὲ καταλήψεις καὶ φαντασίας καὶ ἀγνοίας οὐδὲ τὰς τέχνας ζῷα, τὴν σκυτοτομικὴν, τὴν χαλκοτυπικήν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῷα ποιοῦσι, τὸν περίπατον ζῷον, τὴν ὄρχησιν, τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, τὴν προσαγόρευσιν, τὴν λοιδορίαν. Plutarch is here speaking as an opponent. Seneca, however (Ep. 106, 5). observes: Non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint ... tanquam ira, amor, tristitia: si dubitas, vide an vultum nobis mutent:... Quid ergo? tam manifestas corpori notas credis imprimi, nisi a corpore? See p. 129, 1; Stob. Ecl. ii. 114: The Stoics consider virtues to be substantially identical (τὰς αὐτὰς καθ’ ὑπόστασιν) with the leading part of the soul (ἡγεμονικὸν), and consequently to be, like it, σώματα and ζῷα. Seneca, Ep. 113, 1, speaks still more plainly: Desideras tibi scribi a me, quid sentiam de hac quæstione jactata apud nostros: an justitia, an fortitudo, prudentia ceteræque virtutes animalia sint.... Me in alia sententia profiteor esse.... Quæ sint ergo quæ antiquos moverint, dicam. Animum constat animal esse.... Virtus autem nihil aliud est, quam animus quodammodo se habens: ergo animal est. Deinde: virtus agit aliquid: agi autem nihil sine impetu (ὁρμὴ) potest. If it is urged: Each individual will thus consist of an innumerable number of living beings, the reply is that these animalia are only parts of one animal, the soul; they are accordingly not many (multa), but one and the same viewed from different sides: idem est animus et justus et