[298] Cic. l.c. iii. 10, 25: Is [Chrysippus] igitur: si aliquid est, inquit, quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est homine. Homo autem hæc, quæ in mundo sunt, efficere non potest. Qui potuit igitur, is præstat homini. Homini autem præstare quis possit, nisi Deus? Est igitur Deus. The same, only a little more fully, ibid. ii. 6, 16. To this argument, another favourite one of the Stoics, based on the fulfilment of prophecy, belongs. [299] Cleanthes made use of arguments from final causes to prove the existence of God. Of this nature are all the four arguments which he employs in Cic. N. D. ii. 6, but particularly the fourth, based on the regular order and beauty of heaven. A building cannot exist without a builder; no more can the building of the world exist without a ruling spirit. Therewith Cicero connects the above-named argument of Chrysippus. The same writer, N. D. ii. 32–66, gives very fully the physical theological argument for the existence of providence, which is given in a shorter form by Cleomedes, Meteora, 1; Seneca, De Provid. i. 1, 2–4; Nat. Qu. i.; Sext. Math. ix. 111; conf. Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i. 2, p. 75, Jahn; Plut. Plac. i. 6, 8: belief in gods grows out of considering the world and its beauty, an argument also quoted by Sext. Math. ix. 26. [300] See the expansion of this thought by Cleanthes (in Sext. Math. ix. 88–91) and the Stoics (in Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33). Cicero distinguishes four kinds of beings—Plants, Animals, Men, and that being which is altogether reasonable and perfect deity. [301] See p. 143, 2; 144, 1–4; 145, 1 and 2. [302] Sext. Math. ix. 102, expanding Zeno’s argument given, p. 145, 2: πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις ὡς ἀπό τινος πηγῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται. Cic. N. D. ii. 29: according to Cleanthes, omnem enim naturam necesse est, quæ non solitaria sit, neque simplex, sed cum alio juncta atque connexa, habere aliquem in se principatum [= ἡγεμονικὸν] ut in homine mentem, &c.... Itaque necesse est illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturæ principatus, esse omnium optimum. See following note.