Passing from incomplete to complete utterance, we come, in the first place, to sentences or propositions, [208] all the various kinds of which, as they may be deduced from the different forms of syntax, are enumerated by the Stoics with the greatest precision. [209] Detailed information is, however, only forthcoming in reference to the theory of judgment (ἀξίωμα), which certainly occupied the chief and most important place in their speculations. A judgment is a perfect utterance, which is either true or false. [210] Judgments are divided into two classes: simple judgments, and composite judgments. [211] By a simple judgment the Stoics understand a judgment which is purely categorical. [212] Under the head of composite judgments are comprised hypothetical, corroborative, copulative, disjunctive, comparative, and causal [(α) Simple judgment.] judgments. [213] In the case of simple judgments, a greater or less definiteness of expression is substituted in place of the ordinary difference in respect of quantity; [214] and with regard to quality, they not only make a distinction between affirmative and negative judgments, [215] but, following the various forms of language, they speak of judgments of general negation, judgments of particular negation, and judgments of double negation. [216] Only affirmative and negative judgments have a contradictory relation to one another; all other judgments stand to each other in the relation of contraries. [217] Of two propositions which are related as contradictories, according to the old rule, one must be true and the other false. [218] [(β) Composite judgments.] Among composite judgments the most important are the hypothetical and the disjunctive. As regards the latter, next to no information has reached us. [219] A hypothetical judgment (συνημμένον) is a judgment consisting of two clauses, connected by the conjunction ‘if,’ and related to one another as cause and effect; the former being called the leading (ἡγούμενον), and the latter the concluding or inferential clause (λῆγον). [220] In the correctness of the inference the truth of a hypothetical judgment consists. As to the conditions upon which the accuracy of an inference rests, different opinions were entertained within the Stoic School itself. [221] In as far as the leading clause states something, from the existence of which an inference may be drawn for the statement in the concluding clause, it is also called an indication or suggestive sign. [222] [(γ) Modality of judgments.]