All virtues have, however, one and the same end, which they compass in different ways, and all presuppose the same moral tone and conviction, [651] which is only to be found where it is to be found perfect, and ceases to exist the moment it is deprived of one of its component parts. [652] They are, indeed, distinct from one another, each one having its own end, towards which it is primarily directed; but, at the same time, they again coalesce, inasmuch as none can pursue its own end without pursuing that of the others at the same time. [653] Accordingly, no part of virtue can be separated from its other parts. Where one virtue exists, the rest exist also, and where there is one fault, there all is faulty. Even each single virtuous action contains all other virtues, for the moral tone of which it is the outcome includes in itself all the rest. [654] What makes virtue virtue, and vice vice, is simply and solely the intention. [655] The will, although it may lack the means of execution, is worth quite as much as the deed; [656] a wicked desire is quite as criminal as the gratification of that desire. [657] Hence only that action can be called virtuous which is not only good in itself, but which proceeds from willing the good; and although, in the first instance, the difference between the discharge and the neglect of duty (κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα) depends on the real agreement or disagreement of our actions with the moral law, [658] yet that alone can be said to be a true and perfect discharge of duty which arises from a morally perfect character. [659] [(d) Unity of virtue.] Such a character, the Stoics held, must either exist altogether, or not at all; for virtue is an indivisible whole, which we cannot possess in part, but must either have or not have. [660] He who has a right intention and a right appreciation of good and evil, is virtuous; he who has not these requisites is lacking in virtue; there is no third alternative. Virtue admits neither of increase nor diminution, [661] and there is no mean between virtue and vice. [662] This being the case, and the value of an action depending wholly on the intention, it follows, necessarily, that virtue admits of no degrees. If the intention must be either good or bad, the same must be true of actions; and if a good intention or virtue has in it nothing bad, and a bad intention has in it nothing good, the same is true of actions. A good action is unconditionally praiseworthy; a bad one, unconditionally blameworthy, the former being only found where virtue exists pure and entire; the latter, only where there is no virtue at all. All good actions are, on the one hand, according to the well-known paradox, equally good; all bad actions, on the other, equally bad. The standard of moral judgment is an absolute one; and when conduct does not altogether conform to this standard, it falls short of it altogether. [663] [C. The wise man.] [(1) Wisdom and folly.]