The detection of a submarine even on the surface is largely a matter of looking in the right direction at the right time. The open windows on all sides of the airship, without obstruction by wings give it special value in this field. A submarine submerged is still harder to find as its tell-tale feather is not easy to spot from a speeding plane or from the crow’s nest of a surface craft. A non-rigid airship throttling down to the speed of its prey, and having the altitude of the airplane, has a much better chance of sighting the submarine, before it can launch its torpedoes. Taking off in fog, flying in low visibility, compelled to fly close to the water, these factors do not worry the airship or handicap its usefulness overmuch, and might under given conditions prove extremely useful. The airship appears to have some advantage too in the length of time it may remain on station, ranging from 30 hours at high speed to undetermined days at low. Indeed its endurance is not so much a matter of fuel capacity as of the ability of crews to stand long watches without relief. There might be emergencies where airship scouts were wanted on continuous duty over a considerable period. Commander Roands’ experiments point out interesting possibilities in this respect, through the transfer of fuel and supplies from a surface ship, and the taking on of fresh crews. This generally was the case men saw for the airship up to 1941, as having potential usefulness, in the event of war, against attack by sea. Then came Pearl Harbor, and America’s entrance into a new war. German U-boats, larger, faster, more deadly, moved swiftly in to attack, as if waiting for the signal. The Japs made reconnaissance raids along the West Coast. “Wolf packs” of submarines in new under-water tactics stalked convoys, picked off stragglers. More than 600 coast-wise ships, merchantmen from the Caribbean and South America, and tankers from the Gulf, were sunk in the first year of war. The loss of tankers brought serious complications ashore, the rationing of gas along the eastern seaboard to conserve supply for military purposes. Despite a quickly expanding program of ship construction merchantmen were being sunk faster than they could be built. The Navy’s sea-frontier defense moved to meet the attack. Non-rigid airships were assigned a place in that program, wherever they could be utilized and with what ships were on hand, and new airship construction was rushed. Under authorization from Congress, a program of airship and base construction, together with helium procurement, was accelerated, and by the end of the year, stations were in commission or being built at key points along both coasts and the Gulf of Mexico.