The statement is frequently made, though in slightly different phrases, that the law had no power to punish a man for his belief; for it was strictly contrary to the commands of God that there should be a law which should bring men on to unequal grounds. If a man believed in God it was his privilege to serve him; if he did not believe in him, there was no law to punish him. * * A man was punished only for the crimes he had done; therefore all men were on equal grounds. Unbelief was handled by the church, not by the civil law. The names of those whose hearts were hardened were blotted out and they were remembered no more among the people of God. During the days of the Judges there was no church established by law; when the people served God they elected righteous men for their rulers; when the masses fell into unbelief and transgression they chose Gadianton robbers and such like to administer their laws. If the rights of women, under the law, were any different, more or less, than those of men, we have no information; in fact, the inspired record is entirely silent on this subject. The criminal law inflicted the death penalty for murder, rebellion and treason; for robbery, theft, adultery, sexual abominations, fraud and lying, lesser punishments were inflicted. The first recorded case of execution for murder under the rule of the Judges is that of Nehor, for killing the aged patriot, Gideon. Another noteworthy case is that of Paanchi, the son of Pahoron, of whom it is written that he was tried according to the voice of the people, and condemned unto death; for he had raised up in rebellion, and sought to destroy the liberty of the people. No high priest, judge or lawyer had power to inflict capital punishment. When a man had been tried and condemned to death by the law his condemnation had to be signed by the governor of the land, before the sentence could be carried out. The mention of governor in this relation, with other passages in which the chief judge and governor are spoken of as different persons, suggests the idea that as the Nephites grew in numbers and spread over distant regions, the duties of the chief judge became excessive, and a separation was made between the executive and judicial responsibilities, and divided between two officers.