“Crawford, standing alone on one of the rocks, had been intently watching the progress of the attack; and now, with a shrill tone, ordered the two regiments in reserve to charge. The next moment, a horrid shout startled the French column, and 1800 British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill. Yet so brave, so hardy were the leading French, that each man of the first section raised his musket, and two officers and ten men fell before them. Not a Frenchman had missed his mark--they could do no more. The head of the column was violently thrown back on the rear, both flanks were overlapped at the same moment by the English wings, then terrible discharges at five yards’ distance shattered the waving mass, and a long track of broken arms and bleeding carcases marked the line of fight.” At this battle were engaged the 1st, 5th, 9th, 38th, 43rd, 45th, 52nd, 74th, 83rd, 88th, and the Rifle Brigade. During the pursuit and retreat, both armies plundered somewhat, and three men were hanged at Leira by Wellington for this crime; while skirmishes with the rearguard occurred frequently, showing that the armies were still in close touch. This emphasises the prescience of Wellington in preparing for this emergency. The temporary abandonment of Spain was due entirely to one cause, and that he early and fully recognised. “I have no motive,” he writes, “for withdrawing the British army from Spain, whether of a political or military nature, excepting that which I have stated to you in conversation--namely, a desire to relieve it from the privations of food which it has suffered since the 22nd of last month; privations which have reduced its strength, have destroyed the health of the soldiers, and have rendered the army comparatively inefficient.” Writing after the battle of Talavera, on the 31st July, he says: “It is positively a fact that during the last seven days the British army has not received one-third of its provisions, and that at this moment there are nearly four thousand wounded soldiers dying in hospital from want of common assistance and necessaries,” and this while the Spanish army was well fed. In such a case, even an attempt at embarkation might have been disturbed even more seriously than at Corunna, unless preparations to meet such an emergency were made, let alone the moral effect of such a withdrawal from the Peninsula. Hence, long before, the “lines of Torres Vedras” had been begun, and carried on with the greatest secrecy. Massena was not aware, apparently, of their existence. Those who did know, thought the works were merely for the protection of the capital, and to cover the embarkation if decided on. They were rather too extensive for either. They were in three lines, covering the five roads converging on Lisbon; the outer line was twenty miles from Lisbon, and twenty-nine miles long, extending from the Tagus to the mouth of the Zizambre; the second line, eight miles in rear, was