Here Germany's reason for invading Belgium appeared. French mobilization assumed the integrity of Belgium and Luxemburg. Her mobilization was directed to the German frontier. Had Germany been able to go through Belgium without an hour's delay the situation would have been serious for France, for she mobilized on the wrong front. Germany had correctly assumed that France would expect her to abide by the treaties, and consequently by disavowing these obligations had outguessed her Gallic neighbor. The speedy mobilization of Belgium, and the heroic defense of that little land by its gallant citizens, did much to alter the possible destinies of the war, not because there was at any time any expectation that Belgium would be able entirely to resist the passage of the armies of the kaiser, but because the delay which her defense caused gave the French troops time to mobilize in the direction whither the blow was designed. The first movement against Germany was when M. Eyschen, a member of the cabinet of the Duchy of Luxemburg, drove in his motor car across the great Adolf Bridge, which had been seized by Germany and confronted the leading officer of the German advance guard with a copy of the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of the state. The reigning Grand Duchess Marie Adelaide blocked the way with her motor car, she was ordered to return at once, and when General Vandyck, commandant of Luxemburg, arrived, he was confronted with a revolver. At the end of July, when there was evidence that the storm which had been brewing ever since Austria sent an ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, 1914, thirteen classes of Belgian recruits were called to the colors; but even so, at its full war strength on August 1, 1914, the entire army numbered only 160,000 men. Owing to the small size of the Belgian army and the small territory of that country, and also owing to the fact that it is one of the most thoroughly equipped countries of the world so far as railroads are concerned, Belgian mobilization presented few difficulties for the concentration of the few available troops. But Belgium was in the midst of reorganization of its national defenses and its army, and so was _de facto_ unprepared to use to the utmost the advantages of great fortresses of Liege, Namur, and Antwerp, which could have been made almost impregnable if the necessary field army and artillery material had existed. The fortresses of Liege and Namur demanded a garrison of about 250,000 men and artillery, and there were only about 30,000 men disponible. If the organization of the national defense of Belgium had been completed, the Belgian army would have been probably of a strength of over 600,000 men, well trained, instead of the poorly trained army of about 160,000 combatants equipped only for parade, and the story of that part of the Great War would have been another.