"The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. 'We must put on one side,' said General von Moltke, 'all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favor. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilize, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly,' added the general, 'we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance.' "This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy.... "From these events the following conclusions may be drawn ... these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. _They wish to be always ready._ "As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the [French] Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defenses of the country." On July 30, 1913, M. Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, made an official report on the state of German public opinion, as derived from French diplomatic and consular agents. It said that: "1. The treaty of November 4, 1912, is considered a disappointment for Germany. "2. France--a new France--undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911, is considered ... to want war. "Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists [and of all classes of the people] are unanimous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions: "The treaty of November 4 is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma....