August 27, 1914, the Fourth Army under General de Langle de Cary succeeded likewise in throwing the enemy across the Meuse as he endeavored to secure a footing on the left bank. The success continued on the 28th; on that day a division of this army (First Division of Morocco under the orders of General Humbert) inflicted a sanguinary defeat on a Saxon army corps in the region of Signy l'Abbaye. Thanks to these brilliant successes, the retreat was accomplished in good order and without the French armies being seriously demoralized; as a matter of fact, they were actually put to flight at no point. All the French armies were thus found intact and prepared for the offensive. The right wing of the German army marched in the direction of Paris at great speed, and the rapidity of the German onslaught obliged the French General Staff to prolong the retreat until they were able to establish a new alignment of forces. The new army established on the left of the French armies, and intrusted to General Manoury, was not able to complete its concentration in the localities first intended. In place of concentrating in the region of Amiens it was obliged to operate more to the south. The situation on the evening of September 2, 1914, as a result of the vigorous onward march of the German right, was as follows: A corps of German cavalry had crossed the Oise and had reached Chateau Thierry. The First German Army (General von Kluck), consisting of four active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiegne. The Second Army (General von Buelow), with three active army corps and two reserve corps, had attained to the region of Laon. The Third German Army (General von Hausen), with two active army corps and a reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne and reached Chateau Porcin-Attigny. Farther to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German Armies, making about twelve active army corps, four reserve corps, and numerous Ersatz companies, were in contact with the French troops (Fourth and Fifth Armies) between Vouziers and Verdun, the others from Verdun to the Vosges. Such was the situation. It may be seen, if a map is consulted, that the Fifth French Army, commanded from August 30 by General Franchet d'Esperey, would have found itself in grave peril following on the backward bending of the British and French forces operating on its left, if the French had accepted the challenge of a decisive battle. The French commander in chief resolutely chose the alternative that obviated such a risk, that is, he decided on a postponement of the offensive and the continuation of the retreat.