The clash between the armies of General von Buelow and of General Foch began, as did the battle wrath along the whole front, at dawn of that fateful Sunday, September 5, 1914. General Foch, a well-known writer on strategy, had devised his army for defense. He was well supplied with the famous 75-millimeter guns, holding them massed in the center of his line. His extreme right and left were mobile and thrown partly forward to feel the attack of the invading army. But, in spite of all preparations, General Foch found himself hard-set to hold his own on September 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1914. The battle continued incessantly, by night as well as by day, for the artillerists had found each other's range. There was comparatively little hand-to-hand fighting at this point, General Foch only once being successful in luring the Germans to within close firing range. The results were withering, and General von Buelow did not attempt it a second time. There seems reason to believe that General von Buelow had counted upon acting as a reserve force to General von Kluck during the latter's advance, and that, consequently, he did not think it prudent to risk heavy loss of life until he knew the situation to westward of him. There was some sharp "bomb" work at Fere Champenoise on September 8, and then came the night of the 8th. It will be remembered that at the close of the battle of Montmirail on the evening of September 8, 1914, the western flank of Von Buelow's army had been exposed by the advance of General d'Esperey and the retreat of General von Kluck. Information of this reached Foch, and despite the danger of the maneuver, he thrust out his mobile left like a great tongue. That night the weather turned stormy, facilitating this move. At one o'clock in the morning, the statement has been made, word reached General Foch indirectly that air patrols had observed a gap in the alignment of the German armies between General von Buelow's left and General von Hausen's right. During the darkness and the rain, therefore, General Foch had worked two complete surprises on General von Buelow. He had enveloped the German commander's right flank, and was safely ensconced there with General d'Esperey's army behind him, since the latter had by now advanced to Montmirail. At the same time he had thrust a wedge between Von Buelow and General von Hausen, threatening General von Buelow's left flank as well. The first was a seizure of an opportunity, executed with military promptness, the second was a bold _coup_, and its risk might well have appalled a less experienced general.