From Uzsok to the Lupkow westward stood the Second Austro-Hungarian Army under Boehm-Ermolli on the north of the Carpathians. To his left, southwest of the Magora of Malastow, and adjoining the formidable Germanic array facing the Dunajec-Biala line lay the Third Austro-Hungarian Army under General Boroyevitch von Bojna. These two armies, it will be remembered, took part in the first offensive in January, and had been there ever since. Both of these armies now began to advance into the triangle, and the brilliant simplicity of Von Mackensen's geometrical strategy becomes clear. Let one imagine Galicia as a big stone jar with a narrow neck lying on the table before him, neck pointing toward the left hand, and he will obtain an approximately accurate idea of the topographical conditions. That side of the jar resting on the table represents the Carpathian range, solid indeed, but with numerous openings: these are the passes. The upper side of the jar represents the Russian frontier, across which the invaders had swarmed in and taken possession of the whole inside, lining themselves right along the mouths of the passes at the bottom and across the neck upwards. For months the Austrians vainly endeavored to force an entrance through the thickest walls--from the lower edge, and from the base or bottom of the jar (the Bukowina), apparently overlooking the rather obvious proposition that the cork was the softest part and _that_ was Dmitrieff's Dunajec-Biala line. Here at least no mountain range stood in the way. It may also be regarded as a mathematical axiom that, given sufficient artillery power, the strongest defense the wit of man could devise can be smashed. What Mackensen did, therefore, was to blow a hole through the cork, push in a pair of scissors up to the rivet, meanwhile opening the blades to an angle of about forty-five degrees. From the lower or southern shoulder of the jar the Third Austro-Hungarian Army pushes forward inside, supported on its right by Boehm-Ermolli, who had been just inside a long time, but could get no farther. They began to shepherd the Russian troops around and in the western passes toward the lower double-edged blade of Von Mackensen's terrible scissors. The Russian retreat to the Wisloka was a serious disaster for Dmitrieff; he had been caught napping, and had to pay dearly in men and guns for not having created a row of alternative positions. His force had been a cover for Brussilov's operations on both sides of the western passes as well as for the whole Russian line in the Carpathians. Now that Von Mackensen had pried the lid off, Brussilov's men in the south encountered enormous difficulties in extricating themselves from the Carpathian foothills, suddenly transformed from comparative strongholds into death-traps and no longer tenable. They suffered severely, especially the Forty-eighth Division.