The Story of the Great War, Volume 4: Champagne, Artois, Grodno; Fall of Nish; Caucasus; Mesopotamia; Development of Air Strategy; United States and the War
History
The Story of the Great War, Volume 4: Champagne, Artois, Grodno; Fall of Nish; Caucasus; Mesopotamia; Development of Air Strategy; United States and the War
World War, 1914-1918
From every possible line of human enterprise the Germans, according to
Russian reports, apparently tried to learn lessons which might become
applicable in these near-arctic conditions on the east front. Having
been taught by the previous winter's experience the impossibility of
trench digging, they promptly organized extensive mining detachments
among their engineering troops, augmenting the latter in great
quantities by soldiers from other branches of their general service
who, from their experiences in times of peace, had become particularly
adaptable to such work. These mining troops, later on in the winter,
were to creep forward under the protection of night's shadows and
blast with dynamite those trenches that were absolutely essential for
cover of advancing troops and that could not be dug in the frozen
ground with more simple tools. Long before this, however, while winter
had not yet shown its full severity, these troops were busily occupied
with the preparation of land mines, which were to act as substitutes
for barbed-wire entanglements when freezing snow, piling up many feet
high, rendered the latter useless. Previous experience, too, had
taught that, when such weather conditions arose, the immense
quantities of snow that fall in these regions not only completely
covered barbed-wire entanglements, but as repeated snowstorms
thickened the mass day by day, and sleet and thaw, caused by an
occasional hour's sunshine, hardened it, made it even possible for the
enemy's forces to advance securely on it in spite of, and on the very
top of, all barbed-wire obstacles.
Throughout the first winter of the war the Germans had also used ski
detachments. Most of these were employed in the mountainous regions of
the western front. But small troops had been sent to East Prussia and
had proven themselves very valuable there. Again and again Russian
troops, attempting operations on ground covered with two or three
days' snowfall, had sunk to their waists and chests into the snow and
had become easy prey to attacks made by German soldiers on skis. So
the Germans early in the fall, when certain parts of south Germany and
Austria, covered with high mountains, lend themselves admirably for
ski practice, had sent time after time detachments of carefully
selected infantry troops to these regions and had made ski experts out
of them. Sledges too--large and small--had been provided in
quantities, because they had proven their value as means of
transporting men and supplies where all other means had failed
absolutely.
With the approach of real winter all these comparatively new features
of warfare were put to use. Of course the Germans were by no means the
only ones to profit from past experience and from the modern advance
of the sciences and mechanical industries. But from all reports it is
clear that they outdid the Russians in inventiveness as well as in the
thoroughness and extent of their preparations.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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